27

a cheer and yell that rose high above the roar of battle….

March Thursday 27 1862

Quite cool this morning. I slept at the Union Hospital in Winchester. I came to the Regiment that was camped near the town to the right of the Pike to Strausburg and we have a very fine location and there is nothing new accept our forces are still routing the enemy and following them up on the other side of Strausburg. They have lost a grate many men and I don’t see how they are going to do* in regard to things. The ladies are being kind to the wounded in Winchester and I hope that they may soon be well again and return to respective company. This is a very fine day

*Journal of the Shenandoah Valley During the Civil War Era: A Publication of Shenandoah University’s McCormick Civil War Institute Volume IV 2021 Jonathan Noyalas Footnote 21 in piece by Cheyenne Nimes titled “May Peace Soon be Restored: The 1862 Diary of Ephraim Burket, 110^th Pennsylvania” P. 48

“Two days after this entry Virginia’s governor John Letcher, anticipating the Conscription Act going into effect throughout the Confederacy on April 16, 1862, ordered all militia units throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia disbanded and absorbed into existing Confederate regiments.”

Note Again: Both Ephraim & Hotchkiss (reminder; Hotchkiss is Confederate) agree women in Winchester are aiding the wounded, even heroically:

Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer Jedediah Hotchkiss P. 12

“Thursday, March 27^th: We have news from Winchester about the heroic action of our ladies after Kernstown.”

Note: About 10% of Winchester White male residents are Unionists. Edwin Stanton will visit Kernstown four days later, and tell Lincoln when he returns to D.C. that“The men are all in the army and the women are the devil.”

Note: The Archives Room at https://www.handleyregional.org/services/departments/archives/manuscripts/l/573-WFCHS is where you can find the Col. Lewis papers from the war, which they will email you for cold hard cash. The below letter appears in the O.R., pages 377-378, & contains different words, plus spelling differences, plus no table that Lewis had drawn in his original report. So I transcribed Col. Lewis’ report of the Battle of Winchester, otherwise known as Kernstown, from the original, & obviously included it, as far as I could tell, just how he wrote it. This letter was written on blue-lined notebook-type paper, hard to transcribe because for some reason there are lines of typewritten dark vertical print running down the page as a backdrop that obnoxiously declares Handley Library some kind of eternal copyright holder on this, a letter written by a man who helped hold the Union together 160 years back, as if his ancestors were clamoring for residuals or something. Fuck’s sake.

“Head Quarters 110^th Regt P.V.

Shield’s Division

Winchester Va

March 27^th 1862

Brig Genl Shields

General.

I have the honour to report that on the afternoon of Sunday March 23^rd my command left camp 3½ miles on the main Road of Winchester by Order of Col. Tyler 3^rd Brigade and proceeded with his command immediately to the scene of action that afternoon the Brigade was ordered to the rear and to the left flank of the Enemy and were marched Close Columns by Division into and under cover of a thick woods when a deadly fire immediately was poured in upon them. which for a moment staggered our troops. They soon recovered and my command with the rest of the Brigade advanced to the outskirts of the woods. and returned the fire with great spirits subsequently finding that the enemy held a strong position behind a stone fence across a ravine directly opposite our centre and were harrassing us with their fire. I ordered a a charge of my Command at double quick upon that point which was quite successful the enemy were completely routed on the flank. and driven from their position behind the fence. In this charge the command suffered severely from the fire of the enemy.

The Regiment was rallied after the action in good order and bivouacked with the Brigade on the field adjoining below I respectfully furnish this field return of the killed and wounded in the action.

Killed— — — — 8

Wounded— — — — 43

Missing— — — — None

I have the honour to be your Obedient

Servt.

Wm D. Lewis Jr.

Col. Commanding 110^th. Regt P.V”

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Prepared, Under the Direction of the Secretary of War, By Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott, Third U.S. Artillery, and Published Pursuant to Act of Congress Approved June 16 1880. Series I—Volume XII—In Three Parts. Part 1.—Reports. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1885. P. 375-376

Note: Encountering these misspellings throughout add an urgency to any reading expedition & is one of the few times in my research I felt like I smelled smoke, got a closed-in feeling of rushedness (new word, why not), & got caught up in time travel back to a field outside Kernstown & I could see these men hunched over in far off tents, gingerly lining their sentences up to relay the day to their superiors, after taking dead aim at objects that fell from the sky.

No. 20.

Reports of Col. Erastus B. Tyler, Seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding

Third Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SHIELDS’ DIVISION,

“Camp Kimball, March 26, 1862. SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the action of my command in the battle of Winchester, Sunday, March 23, 1862, together with a report of the killed, wounded, and missing:

On my arrival to the support of General Kimball about 2 p. m. two regiments of my command were brought to the front to support Colonel Daum’s artillery—the Seventh Ohio and Seventh Indiana—the other three remaining in the rear. At about 4 o’clock General Kimball ordered me to proceed with my command down a ravine to the rear of a piece of woods on our right, and thence along the woods to the rear of a point on the enemy’s left flank, where he had a battery of two pieces planted. Lieutenant-Colonel Daum continued to amuse them in the front while I proceeded to execute the order, and Captain Robinson’s battery was sent in the same direction that I moved to a commanding point between the woods and our main point of defense. I succeeded in reaching the enemy’s rear unperceived by him, but found him in large force, as I afterward learned from his wounded, consisting of nine infantry reginnents, and on the eve of attempting a flank movement similar to ours to capture Robinson’s battery. Our front was within musket-range of him when he opened on us, and with such force that I immediately ordered up my reserve. His position was a strong one, and stubbornly maintained for a time, but he was at length forced to fall back before the incessant and well-directed fire of our men. Не was protected in front by a stone fence, while our only breastworks were the scattered trees of the woods and a small natural embankment, say, five rods long, and the fact that all his killed and wounded in that locality were struck in the head speaks in stronger terms than I can use of the skill of our men as marksmen.

After ny brigade had thus bravely stood their ground for at least an hour, I think I may safely say, the Fourteenth Indiana arrived to my support, followed shortly after by the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, Thirteenth Indiana, Sixty-seventh Ohio, and Fifth Ohio, when the complete rout of the enemy was effected, he leaving for me two pieces of artillery-one iron 12-pounder and one brass 6-pounder-with caissons, and all his dead and wounded, amounting, the former to over 300, and the latter unknown, but very large. Considering the enemy’s force and position, I consider my loss as noticed below very small. Both the men and officers of my command fought with the most commendable bravery and determination, and are entitled to special mention, but in this brief report I cannot particularize. The colors of the Seventh Ohio were struck by twenty-eight balls, one carrying away the crescent of the spear-head, another breaking the staff; those of the Seventh Indiana by three, and of the Twenty-ninth Ohio by three balls. The darkness of the evening prevented my following the enemy beyond the ground he had occupied, and early on the following morning the pursuit commenced, continuing until last evening. Thus you will perceive that under the present condition of affairs it is extremely difficult to give an accurate report of the loss in killed, wounded, and missing that my command have sustained. I must not neglect to say that to Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen. E. S. Quay and Aide-de-Camp Henry Z. Eaton, of my staff, I am greatly indebted for the prompt performance of their respective duties. For more definite particulars of the fight I would refer you to my official report to General Kimball. Respectfully submitted. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

E. B. TYLER,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade. Brigadier-General SHIELDS.”

(P. 377-378)

“HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SHIELDS’ DIVISION,

Camp Kimball, Strasburg, March 26, 1862. SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the part taken by my command in the battle of Winchester, Sunday, March 23:

My command left Camp Shields at 11 o’clock a. m. 23d March, reaching the toll-gate south of Winchester just as our batteries were opened upon the enemy. Remaining in column a short time, I received your order to strike the enemy on his left flank with my brigade, composed of the Seventh Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton; Twenty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Buckley; First Virginia, Colonel Thoburn; Seventh Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Cheek, and One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, Colonel Lewis, jr. The order was executed with the Seventh Ohio on the right, the Twenty-ninth Ohio on the left, First Virginia in the center, Seventh Indiana in the right wing, and One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania in the left wing, advancing in column of divisions. When within easy musket-range the enemy opened fire upon us with their infantry force, consisting of nine regiments. The reception was a warm one, and so heavy was it that I ordered up the reserve at once, when the action became general. The fire of the enemy was poured in upon us from behind a stone wall with terrible effect, yet the column moved forward, driving them from their cover into an open wood, when our men gave them a shower of leaden hail. The timely arrival of the Fourteenth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrow, in this unequal contest was of immense service, followed as they were soon after by the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Murray; Thirteenth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, and still later by the Sixty-seventh, Lieutenant Colonel Voris, and Fifth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, routing the enemy just as twilight was fading into night, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. We took from him one 6 and one 12 pounder gun, with their caissons, and about 300 prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded could not have been less than 500.

To speak of the heroic acts of those engaged in the battle would require too much space in this brief report. The officers and men behaved as gallantly as ever men did, and are entitled to great credit. The field officers of the different regiments exerted themselves manfully, many of them having their horses shot under them early in the engagement; others were seriously wounded, yet they pressed forward with their men, determined to conquer or die. Where all did so well, and showed so much daring bravery, it would be unjust to mention one without mentioning all. That officers and men discharged their duty the result plainly shows, and to them belongs the victory. To my acting assistant adjutant-general, E. S. Quay, and aide-de-camp, Henry Z. Eaton, of my staff, I am greatly indebted for the prompt performance of their respective duties. Here with I hand you a report of the dead and wounded of my command.* All of which is respectfully submitted. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. B. TYLER,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade. Acting Brigadier-General KIMBALL,

Commanding Division.”

(P. 377-378) Note: The original Lewis letter (below, #21) can be found in a box at the Handley Library in Winchester. My transcription (earlier in this entry of March 27) differs from the below version. Including two versions shows the easy discrepancies that can result unless you go to the source yourself, & of course my transcription of this March 27 letter is filled with my own idiosyncrasies. Waskie has a version that isn’t accurate, as I’m sure do others who may or may not have examined the original. This isn’t that unusual. But unless you’re a paleographer, or whatever the term is, you’ll make mistakes too, even then. Chilling how easy history can get twisted, then passed down as truth. Truth is only these men themselves knew what they wrote, but if you showed them their own copy days, months, years later, even they may not know. This is where the Real War hides, too.

No. 21.

“Report of Col. William D. Lewis, jr., One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Infantry.

HDQRS. 110TH REGT. PA. VOLS., SHIELDS’ DIVISION,

Winchester, Va., March 27, 1862. GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of Sun. day, March 23, my command left camp, 34 miles on the main road east of Winchester, by order of Colonel Tyler, Third Brigade, and proceeded with his command immediately to the scene of action that afternoon, The brigade was ordered to the rear and to the left flank of the enemy, and was marched close column by division into and under cover of a thick wood, when a deadly fire was immediately poured in upon them, which for the moment staggered our troops. They soon recovered, and my command, with the rest of the brigade, advanced to the outskirts of the woods and returned the fire with great spirit. Subsequently, finding that the enemy held a strong position behind a stone fence across a ravine directly opposite our center and were harassing

* Embodied in rovised statement, p. 346.

us with their tire, I ordered a charge of my coinmand at “double-quick” upon that point, which was quite successful. The enemy were completely routed on their flank and driven from their position behind the fence. In this charge the command suffered severely from the fire of the enemy. The regiment was rallied after the action in good order, and bivouacked for the night with the brigade on the field adjoining. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

WM. D. LEWIS, JR., Colonel One hunilred and tenth Regiment Pennsylvania Vols. Brigadier General SHIELDS.”

No. 22.

(P. 378-379)

“Abstract from

Record of Erents” in Williams’ division, Fifth Army

Corps.*

March 20.–Division ordered to march with all possible dispatch from Winchester to Centreville. Brigadier-General Williams assumed command.

The First Brigade marched from Winchester for Manassas on March 22. While at Castleman’s Ferry, waiting for the Third Brigade to cross the Shenandoal, the brigade, in pursuance of a note from Major Copeland, assistant adjutant-general, counter-marched, and encamped at Berryville, Va. While encamped at Berryville, in pursuance of a note received from General Shields, commanding at Winchester, requesting brigade to sipport his command, then warmly engaged with the enemy at Kernstown, near Winchester, the brigade marched from Berryville to the field of battle, near Middletown, marching 36 miles in ten consecutive hours, and re-enforcing General Shields’ command while engaged with the enemy. Brigade continued the pursuit of the enemy to Strasburg on March 24 and 25. and occupied Strasburg until the close of the month. During the forced march of the brigade from Berryville to Strasburg the shoes of one-half of the men in the brigade were wornout and rendered worthless. New shoes are urgently needed, but, although repeated requisitions therefor have been made, they have not yet been supplied.

The Second Brigade marched March 21 to Berryville; March 22, to Snickersville; March 23, to Aldie, and thence to Manassas Junction, where it remained detached from the division at the close of the month.

The Third Brigade marched, March 22, from Winchester to Castleman’s Ferry; March 23, to Snickersville; March , from Snickersville back to Winchester; March 25, from Winchester to Middletown; March 26, from Middletown to Strasburg, where it remained at the close of the month.

The First and Third Brigades picketed the advance of the Fifth Corps, opposite the enemy, in force, from March 25 to 31, being engaged during that time in daily skirmishes with the enemy.

*From division and brigade returns First Division for month of March, 1862.”

(P. 379)

No. 23.

“Reports of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, (.8. Army, commanding the Valley District, with resolution of the Confederate Congress. HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

Rapidan, Va., March 25, 1862. His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

SIR: I have just received the inclosed letter from General Jackson. He evidently attacked the enemy under a misapprehension as to his force. He had previously reported it reduced from about 28,000 to 10,000 men. He now represents the Federal force in the valley as too strong to be driven back by a mere detachment of this army. In such an operation our communications would be completely exposed to McOlellan.

It is reported that a bridge over the Shenandoah has been made on the Snickersville road. Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON.”

(Inclosure.)

“HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,

Near Newtown, Va., March 24, 1862. GENERAL: As the enemy had been sending off troops from the district and from what I could learn were still doing so, and knowing your great desire to prevent it, and having a prospect of success, I engaged him yesterday about 3 p. m. near Winchester and fought until dusk, but his forces were so superior to mine that he repulsed me with the loss of valuable officers and men killed and wounded; but from the obstinacy with which our troops fought and from their advantageous position I am of the opinion that his loss was greater than mine in troops, but I lost one piece of artillery and three caissons.

On Saturday two brigades went down to Berryville with their bag. Gage. The supposition is that they have crossed at Castleman’s Ferry. From a prisoner whom we took I learn that more troops had marching orders at Winchester. This fight will probably delay, if not prevent, their leaving, and I hope will retain others. From what I hear there are 15,000 troops at Berryville, Charlestown, and Harper’s Ferry. Shields yesterday appears to have had seventeen regiments of infantry. I heard he had much less when I made the attack. To drive him back if he advances 1 ought to have 5,000 infantry. I have enough artillery. The heavy guns were sent to Gordonsville. I will try and remain on this side of Strasburg. My wagons have gone to the rear and my forces are waiting to see whether the enemy will advance. Ashby is about 5 miles from Winchester, Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON,

Major-General. General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, Comdg. Dist. Of Northern Va.”

“HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,

Near Mount Jackson, March 29, 1862. MY DEAR GENERAL: My information, from a spy who left Winchester on day before yesterday, is that from 8,000 to 10,000 of the enemy came in pursuit of me on Monday, and that nearly the same number has come from Winchester in the direction of Strasburg since then; that they had been leaving in this direction every day since Sun. day up to the time of his leaving town, and that there must be about Strasburg between 16,000 and 20,000. From the report of Captain Hess, who has charge of a party of observation, there were about 10,000 who came out on Monday. No passes, not even to negroes, are given to leave Winchester in the direction of Strasburg. On the roads leading northward persons leave town without passes. The enemy continued to return to Winchester from Castleman’s from near 10 a. m. till near 4 p. m., and it is believed that all the force that had recently gone to Castleman’s, with the exception of about three regiments, returned, and all the force at Winchester, with the exception of two or three regiments, has moved toward Strasburg.

There are no troops left at the encampment near Mrs. Carter’s, beyond Winchester. The lowest estimate made in Winchester of the killed and wounded of the enemy is 1,000; the highest 1,500. Mr. Philip Williams, of Winchester, whom you probably know, says that he feels safe in putting the number at 1,200. My impression is that the estimate is too large, though I can only judge from the history of battles and what I saw. Three hundred and forty-one of my command fell into the hands of the enemy, so far as could be ascertained in Winchester; of this number, 81 killed and about 40 so badly wounded that they could not be sent off to the east. A committee of the citizens buried our dead, and the wounded have received that attention which only women can give.

Philip Williams has been told by a gentleman from Baltimore that there is an expedition fitting out against Magruder, and he attaches importance to the statement. It is well to remark that Mr. Williams is a warm friend to our cause, but sustains no other relation to the Army. I make this statement lest this letter might fall into the hands of the enemy.

The Federal troops at Moorefield have taken possession of the keys of the court-house and jail. It appears that one object of their incursion is to unite that section of the State to the Peirpoint government. Very truly, yours,

T. J. JACKSON. General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.”

Note: https://valley.lib.virginia.edu/or/R11215348 is where you will find the following dispatch from Copeland to Shields regarding the 110^th at Kernstown.

Background: Assistant Adjutant to General Banks, Major & abolitionist Robert Morris Copeland will be dismissed for “Having violated an important trust committed to him while serving on the staff of the general commanding the Department of the Shenandoah.” (As quoted by Patrick Browne at https://historicaldigression.com/2015/08/14/the-cashiering-of-major-robert-morris-copeland, a well-written, fascinating account of Copeland’s troubles, worth reading even for just what Copeland claimed Lincoln said to him, here in part: “….because you don’t get as much notice as you think you deserve, you are trying to make trouble…The fact is, I am inclined to believe that you are a mischief-making fellow, and good for but little as an officer, and capable of doing a great deal of harm; and therefore, the sooner you are out of the service, the better.”

Banks, Lincoln, & Stanton will turn against Copeland, yet Grant, in 1870, will revoke the dismissal. Copeland will write a book on “country life” gardening after the war, & help design Sleepy Hollow Cemetery in Massachusetts. But for now, he will malign the 110th in his report to Shields, with “Having in vain attempted to rally the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers (which, with such company officers, as I could see, was in a shameful rout)….”

“HDQRS. FIFTH ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Strasburg,

Brig. Gen. JAMES SHIELDS,
Commanding Division.

March 26, 1862.

SIR:

In reply to your communication of to-day I would say that after receiving your orders on the 23rd instant to visit the scene of action and report, I went at once. On my arrival I found we had on our left wing a battery and one of two regiments. The center and right wing were composed of three batteries and about five regiments of infantry, with a considerable force of cavalry. A high and commanding position on our right was occupied by the enemy at about 3 o’clock p.m. and a severe fire opened on our center, which compelled the withdrawal of a portion of our force into a more secure position.

At about 3.30 p.m. Col. Tyler was ordered to attack the enemy’s new position on our right and to take their battery. He moved immediately forward with three or four regiments, a battery, and about 400 left wing. In about half an hour after Col. Tyler’s movements his skirmishers exchanged shots with the enemy, who were posted behind high stone walls, a rocky hill, and some woods a quarter of a mile in front of his battery. The enemy reserved his fire until our line was very near. They then arose and poured in a very heavy volley. The suddenness and strength of their fire caused our lines to falter, and the extreme left, composed mainly of the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, broke and ran. The rest of the line soon rallied and maintained a steady fight (falling back on the right and advancing on the left) for at least half an hour, when two regiments came to their assistance up the left flank and through a very severe fire. They advanced steadily, and soon gained a position from which they could flank the enemy, delivering their fire. When they received this new fire the enemy fell back rapidly, but still fighting, to the woods nearest to the hill, from which the battery had been in the mean time withdrawn.

Having in vain attempted to rally the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers (which, with such company officers, as I could see, was in a shameful rout), I joined the advance on the first field which the enemy had held, where there were many dead and wounded. I questioned such as could answer, and learned that Jackson was present with about 6,000 men, having arrived with the largest part of his command at 3 p.m. He had posted about 3,000 in the first field, and had reserved 3,000 more in position behind the offensive battery and in the woods half a mile to the front. Before communicating this to Col. Tyler I took the liberty of ordering the cavalry to advance by a side road toward the near of the enemy’s reserve, and then communicated to Col. Tyler, who was advancing his force so as to support Cols. Kimball’s and Sullivan’s forces, which were nearest the enemy, and moved slowly forward.

The enemy now opened on our line with a heavier fire than before. We maintained our position from the first, and soon drove them in utter confusion down the hill, but the near approach of night forbade farther pursuit, and a halt was ordered. Our troops commenced preparations for bivouacking and for removing our dead. I rode over the field and saw that the enemy could not have lost less than 100 killed and 200 wounded, and judged that our loss was about the same. The wounds of the enemy seemed generally more severe than ours. The cavalry came around the hill at a very good time, and captured about 150 prisoners. On the side of the woods in the rear of the enemy’s battery there were one cannon and two overturned caissons. There were large numbers of muskets strewed about in the different fields, which I ordered to be stacked for future removal. Also the enemy seemed to have in many cases thrown aside their equipments to expedite their flight.

As there seemed no further reason to expect attack, I returned to the city and reported myself to your headquarters. I afterward learned that the enemy had twenty-eight pieces of artillery in reserve at Kernstown, which were removed as soon as the day seemed to be unfavorable. The report amongst the people along the road is that Jackson carried back 1,000 less than what went to Winchester.

In regard to the enemy at present, I believe he is near Staunton. Ashby and a considerable amount of cavalry, with two pieces of artillery, are about 3 miles from here. The infantry, it is believed, are entirely worn-out and demoralized, but are too far for us to overtake.

I am, general, with much respect, your most obedient servant,

R. MORRIS COPELAND,
Assistant Adjutant-Gen. and Maj. Volunteers.”

(Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 12, Serial No. 15, Pages 347-348, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.)

Note: “….and then threw themselves, with immense cheering and an unearthly yell, upon the enemy, who, receiving at 15 yards our first fire, fell back across the field, thus unmasking two 6-pounder iron guns, which hurled, on being clear in front, death and destruction into our ranks….”

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Part 1.—Reports. P. 349-351

No. 5

Report of Capt. R.C. Shriber, Aide-de-Camp, U.S. Army

Winchester, March 26, 1862.

GENERAL: I beg most respectfully to report to you that after having received on Sunday last, the 23^rd of March, at 9 a.m., an order to report for duty as an aide-de-camp on your staff, I left headquarters for Kernstown, to assist Colonels Kimball, Tyler, and Sullivan in their efforts, as commanders of brigades, fighting the enemy under General Jackson, and to insure a unity of action of their three respective commands. I reported at 9:30 a.m. to Colonel Kimball, acting brigadier and senior officer on the field, who was stationed upon a hill about half a mile west of Kernstown, which latter place is perpendicularly intersected by the turnpike leading to Strasburg. There I informed myself as to the events which had transpired previous to my arrival on the field, and understood that the enemy, who had been repulsed in endeavoring to drive in our pickets the day before, had opened with his artillery at about 8 a.m. upon our forces again, and that since that time were engaged in responding to his battery of four guns, which he then had in play, and endeavoring to repel his small but harassing attacks of cavalry upon our chain of sentinels.

Reconnoitering the ground surrounding me, I found that between the hill upon which I stood with Colonel Kimball and the hill opposite us, upon upon which the enemy’s battery was posted, about half a mile distant, a ravine was lying, running from east to west, which is entirely free of wood. When about half a mile to the east a forest connected both hills, through the center of which passes a mud road, and which is bounded on its extreme right by another mud road leading to Cedar Creek. The country to the left (west) of the turnpike is flat, and commanded by Captain Jenks, First Virginia Artillery, to oppose the enemy’s guns, which latter was soon re-enforced by a whole battery; whereupon Captain Clark’s regular battery was put in prolongation of the former named. Both batteries were fought by Colonel Daum, hot for the enemy, and they brought in a third battery in the direction of their right wing in such position upon our two batteries as to enfilade them, but continued their fire.

In the mean time the infantry regiments were moving up to the support of our batteries, and formed into line of battle about 1,000 yards to the rear of our batteries, when at once the enemy’s heavier battery aimed shells into our batteries and the cavalry and infantry stationed upon the interior slope of the battery hill, and and the necessity to storm and take their guns became evident. In conjunction with Colonels Kimball and Tyler the following infantry regiments were drawn up in mass parallel with each other; the right, resting upon the mud road passing through the forest, was held by the Seventh Ohio, the Sixty seventh and Fifth following, and the Thirteenth Indiana, Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, and Twenty-ninth Ohio a little to the rear, thus leaving the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania, Fourteenth Indiana, and three companies of the Eighth Ohio in reserve.

During the time these arrangements were made a messenger was sent to you, general, to have your approval as to this flank movement, and I personally apprised all the commanders in the rear and flanks of our intentions, so as to keep them on the alert. Colonel Daum was enjoined to keep his artillery in lively fire, so as not to divert the attention of the enemy from him, and when the order came to move on everything was ready to respond. General Tyler moved his column by the right flank as far as the Cedar Creek road, rested his right upon the same, and the left upon the before-mentioned mud road, pushing forward upon both roads some cavalry; changed direction to the left right in front, and moved silently but steadily upon the enemy’s left, through the woods for about half a mile, when, coming upon a more sparsely wooded ground, he made a half-wheel to the left and came to face of the extreme flank of the enemy, who received him, posted behind a stone wall at about 200 yards’ distance with a terrific volley from rifled arms; but still on went the regiments without a return fire, and then threw themselves, with immense cheering and an unearthly yell, upon the enemy, who, receiving at 15 yards our first fire, fell back across the field, thus unmasking two 6-pounder iron guns, which hurled, on being clear in front, death and destruction into our ranks with their canister. But still onward we went, taking one gun and two caissons, and making there a short stand. Again the enemy unmasked two brass pieces, which at last drove us by their vigorous fire back; but I caused the captured gun to be tipped over, so that the enemy, in regaining it, could not drag it away.

The Fifth Ohio and Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania threw themselves once more with fixed bayonets forward, the former losing four times in a few minutes their standard-bearer. Captain Whitcom at last took the colors up again, and cheering on his men, fell also. So Colonel Murray, gallantly leading on his Eighty-fourth. In fact, that ground was strewn with dead and wounded. General Tyler lost there his aide, Lieutenant Williamson, Twenty-ninth Ohio. I hurried back to bring up the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania and Fourteenth Indiana by a right-oblique movement through the woods, and the enemy, receiving all the combined shock and fire, retired, and left us in possession of our dearly-bought gun and caissons. United we pressed forward again, the enemy’s two brass pieces and musketry pouring in their fire into our ranks. Three companies of the Eighth Ohio re-enforcing us, we gained one brass piece and its caissons, and compelled the enemy to fall back. This was at 7 p.m. I moved to the right flank and caused the cavalry to go forward on the now fast-retreating enemy, when I met with 6 of Ashby’s cavalry, who shot down my orderly and killed his horse, one of the bullets piercing my cap. I was forced to use my sword to kill one of them. The cavalry captured 230 prisoners and met only with little resistance from the enemy’s cavalry.

At 8 p.m. The musketry ceased. A few more of the cannon shots from their extreme left battery were fired, so as to withdraw our attention from the retreating foe, and all was over. Our men remained on the field of battle picking up the wounded, and slept upon their arms, to awake for the pursuit of the enemy on the morning of the 24^th, who fell rapidly back beyond Newton, when at 9 o’clock of the morning of that day Major-General Banks took command, and I reported back to you.

General, I have the honor to be ever ready to serve in this glorious body of soldiers under your able leading.

Most respectfully, your obedient, humble servant,

R.C. SHRIBER,

Aide-de-Camp and Acting Inspector General.

Brig. Gen. JAMES SHIELDS,

Commanding Second Division, Fifth Corps d’ Armée.

The 110th Pennsylvania Volunteers at Kernstown: the True Story Andy Waskie http://wesclark.com/jw/110thpa_at_kernstown.html

“A short article appeared in the last edition of this eminent Journal (Vol. II, No. IV, Nov. 1986, pg. 16) entitled: “Can this be true?” It concerned the role of the 110th at the battle of Kernstown, and was submitted by a member of this Company. I take the liberty to summarize this piece and would then like to comment upon it in order to set the record straight for our beloved regiment concerning this notable and bloody action. Since the 110th rendered noble, conspicuous and gallant service in the battle of Kernstown on March 23, 1862, the study of their achievement begs clarification and publication.

I have examined all possible sources of information concerning the battle, both primary and secondary, which were available to me, and report without equivocation the fruits of my research. The primary sources consist mostly of firsthand reports of the action by unit commanders and other eyewitness accounts, mostly from the Official Records , Vol. XII, Part I. The secondary sources consist of battle accounts written later by non-participants, and often use available primary sources.

The information in “Can this be true?” comes from a spurious article which appeared in the June/July ’86 issue of Blue and Grey magazine. This article reports Tyler’s Brigade (Erastus Tyler, 3rd Brigade of Shield’s 2nd Division, V Corps Army of the Potomac) containing 3,200 men. Tyler actually had less than 2,500 present for duty due to detached service and straggling as a result of the arduous march of the preceding days (Official Records, Series I, Vol. XII, Part I, pp. 335-344).

The 110th at Kernstown had approximately 300 men in the ranks, lost 1 officer and 7 enlisted men killed, 4 officers and 39 men wounded, none missing or captured for a total of 51 casualties, or an almost 20% casualty rate. (compared to the 10.8% figure of the article).

“Stonewall” Jackson, commanding the Confederate “Valley” Army reports his infantry force as approximately 3,000, not 2,000 as recorded in the aforementioned article. Jackson had 6 batteries at Kernstown (27 guns of which 18 were actually engaged). The batteries were those of Chew, Shumaker, McLaughlin, Carpenter, Water and Marye. The article also mentions 3 batteries well-placed to defend the right flank, but the Federal attack came on the Rebel left flank.

The 110th Pennsylvania is identified in the article as belonging to Tyler’s Brigade, which is indeed true, but many of the details are shameful distortions or monstrous and deceitful phantasms, bearing little resemblance to reality. As you will soon learn from the reports filed, the 110th at Kernstown could muster little more than 300 men fit for service (Bates, History of Penna. Vols. Vol III, p. 979) and not 460, as appears in the article. What follows next appears to be some clearly subjective, prejudicial bombast concocted from some uninformed sources. Thus, the reference to a “shameful rout” credited to a staff officer; and another reference to the confused uselessness of the 110th for “the remainder of the day,” credited to an unnamed and unknown soldier are, at best, inaccurate and mistaken or, at worst, patently false. These statements do not bear up when the record is closely scrutinized, and besmirch the record of a gallant regiment, complimented officially for its meritorious service in the battle of Kernstown; and, worst of all, dishonor the fallen heroes of the 110th who gave their lives in this battle.

I take liberty now to list excerpts from the reports of the commanders involved in the battle which cite the role of the 110th in the action, in order to clear up any inaccuracies and lay to rest any doubt about the gallant, heroic service of the regiment on that 23rd day of March 1862.”

Official report of Signal Officer W.W. Rowley from Hdqrs. Dept. of Shenandoah, New Market, Va. April 21, 1862

About 3 P.M., Col. Tyler was ordered to advance with his five regt’s to turn the enemy’s left and capture a battery. He was met with a heavy force, which poured in upon him volley after volley with deadly effect, but our forces, under Col. Tyler answered it with a will.

Note: Following are 3 of the 9 reports Waskie cites re the 110^th at Kernstown:

“Correction to above report of Shields from Winchester, Va. 3/26/1862 to Secretary of War Stanton

I hasten to make correction. Investigation this day has satisfied me that the Penna. regiments (84th and 110th) behaved as bravely as any on the field. Through the eyes of others I was momentarily misled by misstatements. It affords me infinite gratification to be able to correct them, and to do full justice to a body of brave troops who have suffered dreadfully. You will please expunge that portion of my communication which makes them an exception, as I do in a copy I retain.”

Note: And another:

Unofficial account of the engagement contained in a letter from Col. Wm. D. Lewis, Col. of the 110th Pa. to Gov. Andrew Curtin of Pa. from Winchester, Va. March 30, 1862

Hon. A.G. Curtin,

Dear Governor,

I have been intending for some time past to write you a letter informing you of some of the doings of the 110th but have been waiting until something of interest, should occur to do so. Since the terrible battle of Sunday last we have been kept quite busy. Indeed, we have known but little rest since our departure from Camp Curtin. All sorts of fatiguing forced marches and duty have been heaped upon us, but in justice to the men I must say that they have endured all exposures, & hardships without complaint. Fortunately our subsistence depdt. has been well attended to & I have done my best for the comfort of the men.

You have heard however, doubtless, from time to time of our movements etc and it is therefore useless to look back that far. But of the Battle of Sunday you would no doubt like to hear some of the details of the Pennsylvania boys doings. Our Camp, “Tyler’s Brigade”, was situated some 3-1/2 miles north of “Winchester” on the “Martinsburg” road. Genl. Shields ordered on Saturday evg. the entire Brigade up to the town, in consequence of the skirmish of that afternoon. We arrived there during the evg. & bivouacked in an open field adjoining the town for the night. Next morng we were ordered back to our Camp which we reached about 12 o’clk. M. when the men (very hungry) began cooking a hearty meal combining Breakfast and Dinner, and had but just commenced when an order came for us to immediately report to Col. Kimball of the 1st Brigade (Comdg. the Division) as “Jackson” had marched to within 3 miles south of the town & “Kimball” was marching to engage him. We reached him as soon as quick marching would take us in good time & found that the Rebels were occupying strong points in great force. The Cannonading was very severe and as we were waiting upon the road, for orders to take our position the men were obliged to fall to the ground to let the shells pass over them. We were soon ordered to take position to the rear & left of the enemy and endeavor to out-flank them and Capture one of their batteries. This involved a march of about 1/4 of a mile & as we went we halted in an orchard to strip the men of their over-coats, blankets etc. preparatory to going into action. We soon reached our position – the men anxious for their turn to come. The official return of our part of the action, I send you herewith a Copy of. But as it is only confined to bare facts, I will add some lines giving some particulars. As soon as the enemy had found out that we had taken position they opened upon us, whilst still under cover of the woods, a most deadly & destructive fire which at the moment was unexpected to us & our men were very properly ordered to fall, in order that they should escape the fire, & give them time to bring themselves to their senses. The fire of the enemy was most determined, but soon our troops made a dash from the woods and the engagement was general, our troops staggering at times & falling back, yet rallying with increased vigor each time, and firing with great effect. The Rebels were mostly screened by stone walls, which accounts for their mostly being shot in the upper part of the body and head. The fighting has now been going on for some time and each Regiment fighting pretty much on its’ own hook. Col. “Daum” of “Daum’s Battry” rode up to me, & said Col. Lewis, if you do not make a charge across that ravine and dislodge the enemy opposite your center we are lost, and in fact we were nearly flogged at this juncture. I replied “Col. the charge will be a desperate one”. He said “yes, very”. I did not hesitate a moment but faced my men by the rear rank & left – half wheel down we went at a charge double-quick time. The charge was completely successful & we dislodged the enemy from behind their stone wall driving them like sheep before us, wounding and killing as many as we wanted to. In this charge we received the full fire on our left flank from the enemy engaged upon the hill and my loss was severe, some 8 being killed & 38 wounded. On we pressed, & as we gained ground it was a fearful spectacle to see the vast number of the enemy’s killed and wounded strewn around the route. For this charge, my men deserve the greatest praise & I feel sure that they will get what they deserve. They certainly fought like devils, and obeyed my orders strictly. They only wanted to know what to do, to do it . From this time our prospects brightened, & our men, much encouraged, advanced bravely, completely routing the enemy, and capturing 4 cannon – one taken from the Rhode Island men at “Manassas”. Our color had 3 bullets through it, & the spear shot off. By dark we were masters of the Field & the Brigade bivouacked that night adjoining the battle field in utter darkness – no camp fires being allowed to be lighted. It was a long, cold, & dreary night. About one hour before day-break we were called up, preparatory to starting in pursuit of the Rebels, when we found ourselves reinforced by Genl. Williams’ Brigade, & on we went to five miles beyond “Strasburg”. The enemy made a stand two or three times a day availing themselves of every strong point to engage our Artillery, but I feel satisfied that it was only their rear guard holding us in check as their main body advanced. At any rate they gained ground on us fast. We bivouacked in the open field again for the night, making now our 4th night in the open field, when I was called up at 3-1/2 o’clk. on Wednesday morng. by an order from Genl. Shields to report to him “at once” with my Regiment at his Head Quarters at “Winchester”. As mine was the only advancing Regiment ordered back, we could not surmise why this order came, but I made the march back (20 miles) in good time, reaching Winchester during the afternoon. On reporting at Hd.Qrs. I was informed that Genl. Shields anticipated joining his command in a day or so, & that on his leaving I was to take command of the Post, which is considered a very important one. I shall have a good command of Cavalry, Artillery, & Infantry, & as nearly all are Secesh here, my berth will be no small one. The General will probably leave to-morrow. Altho’ the appointment is a compliment, I must confess I should have preferred remaining with the advancing column.

Major Unger has been to see us & I have given him all the information in my power.

And now Governor can you not send me one Company? My command is slim & my men are heavily taxed for duty. I have 100 out daily on picket duty, 45 for Camp police, 15 with the division as teamsters, 58 in the hospitals as nurses, 96 sick in the hospital, & camp, one whole company detached at “Paw Paw” & 2 of my teams attend to Commissary stores. Our total wounded is about sixty . Forty-three is official from the hospital, but many slight cases did not go to hospital & consequently are not reported. I have room for just one Company, as I have had to consolidate two skeleton Companies, who had no hopes of recruiting. This leaves me 9 Companies and I want the tenth. Our duties are likely to be arduous for some time to come, & independent of all I fell sure that you could send them nowhere, where they could render more service. Capt. Baker’s command are I know anxious to join me, as their friends are here. The command is in good order, and in a good state of discipline.

But I must close, for I fear that my letter may become tiresome. Yet I could not but suppose that you might be interested to hear some particulars of the action of one of Penna.’s Regmt. in so terrible a battle.

With my kindest regards to yourself & family, & also Major Russell, I am

Very respy yr obdt. servt.

Col. 110th Regt. P.V.

P.S. On the next page I give the copy of my official report.

Note: “the men were obliged to fall to the ground to let the shells pass over them” Would anyone out there besides Jackson’s men prefer they stayed standing?

And another report, where Waskie notes at the point Col. Murray dies before his men, the 84^th get panicky, & wouldn’t you:

Official report of Lieut. George Whitcamp

Act. Adj. of 5th Ohio Inf. March 26, 1862

At last the 84th Pa. advanced to support our left flank, but twice they fell back. The third time their brave Colonel urged them to follow him and stand fast. It was under that advance that the gallant Col. Murray lost his life. When the colonel fell his regt. retreated and could not be rallied again. Lt. Col. Patrick beseeched them not to leave the field, but they had taken the panic, and it became infectious.. (perhaps it is the rout of the 84th Pa. which gave rise to the confusion about the 110th; although even the 84th later rallied – Ed.)

Note: The final report Waskie cites is an excerpt by Copeland, which is above here in full. Waskie writes of that, “Why Major Copeland in the final report listed chose to single out the 110th and defame its character in the official records, I do not know.”

The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat Earl J. Hess P. 95

“Most Union soldiers stayed well within the acceptable definition of courage. They stayed in line in battle, followed orders, and contributed their small part to winning the war. They did not always perform their duties with enthusiasm and conviction, but they generally avoided the appearance of disobedience. If not for this stoic attitude, the Union war effort would have collapsed at its leading edge, the battlefield.

What held these men to their work? There are as many answers to that question as there were soldiers, for each individual had his own set of reasons for carrying on even after he learned that the reality of combat did not match his romantic conceptions of it. The factors that kept men in line of battle were more complicated, multifaceted, and diverse than the factors that impelled them to support the war effort as civilians ans then to join the army. It is impossible to demonstrate with “scientific” accuracy whether one factor was dominant. There are surviving letters, diaries, and memoirs from only a minority of Northern veterans. All one can do is to identify the recurrent themes in these personal accounts and construct a multilayered view of the varied ways in which their authors came to grips with the emotional challenges of battle.”

*Of all the Civil War troops, Frémont’s Valley troops were supposedly the most undersupplied. He writes Stanton June 26, “Circumstances had brought the troops now with me into a state of incipient scurvy, and their enfeebled condition induced much illness, more especially of typhoid fevers.” “Good and sufficient provisions and other supplies, and our men will rapidly recover health and strength.”

Note: Today, Major Rutherford B. Hayes, of the 23^rd Ohio– future Governor of Ohio, then U.S. President– writes to S. Birchard:

“March 27, 1862.—A wintry morning—snow two or three inches deep, ground frozen; the ninth day since this equinonctial set in. P. M. The sun came out bright and warm about 9 A. M.; the snow melted away, and before night the ground became [began] to dry off so that by night we had a very fair battalion drill.

News of a battle near Winchester in which General Shields was wounded. Union victories. I am gradually drifting to the opinion that this Rebellion can only be crushed finally by either the execution of all the traitors or the abolition of slavery. Crushed, I mean, so as to remove all danger of its breaking out again in the future. Let the border States, in which there is Union sentiment enough to sustain loyal State Governments, dispose of slavery in their own way; abolish it in the permanently disloyal States, in the cotton States– that is, set free the slaves of Rebels. This will come, I hope, if it is found that a stubborn and prolonged resistance is likely to be made in the cotton States. President Lincoln’s message recommending the passage of a resolution pledging the aid of the general Government to States which shall adopt schemes of gradual emancipation, seems to me to indicate that the result I look for is anticipated by the Administration. I hope it is so.”

Note: On this day in 1866, President Johnson will veto the Civil Rights Act: “The distinction of race and color is by the bill made to operate in favor of the colored race against the white race.” …

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ladies are being kind to the wounded….

So by April 1865, some things just don’t stand. Slaveholders weren’t who they took themselves to be, never would be, no matter who they thought they were before. Permanent owners of human flesh.

The Lost Cause could have been if only the right wind had carried a circumstance that didn’t, after all, blow in, couldn’t, after all, coalesce… it came down to fate. That residual smell in the air. That somewhere toward a last point, standing in sorrow watching the tail lights fade on the backside of Route 24, they had fate left to themselves & nothing else. Fate they claimed, then elaborated on the legend, what’s endlessly depicted in the oldest stories, so the tale as mean bone & counterfeit as it was became the bloodlife of the Lost Cause. The lies crumble century after century behind them as they go on with the same story. The fact it never happened doesn’t make it any less of a truth to them. Fate, a motion in back of the inexpressible so it ends up a ghost narrative because no matter the length of visible light now so far gone, from nothing comes nothing in the evidence of a ream stretching back centuries. Theories made up after the fact, then metastasized in text. The Lost Cause a tale that comes to a full stop like a failed creation myth. Generations of fictions built on traditions built on fictions built on tradition. Infinite regression. Horse thieves.

It was always a Lost Cause because there was nothing to get back any of them ever had a right to.

They have justified themselves on every point in the claims, counter-claims, counter-counter-claims, counter-counter-counter-claims. Parenthetical explanations like Russian nesting dolls, theories formed independent of the evidence & facts, anything to accrete to the pieces already long gone.

But it can look real when you get the light just right. They can make the public believe anything when the light gets just right.

It can be simply put: fate, using fate to justify losing the war.

No, it’s exactly what it is.

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