Day 100. June 8, 1862. CROSS KEYS.

100

Hogs also ate the living….

Note: Today is the Battle of Cross Keys; tomorrow the Battle of Port Republic. (I include a number of writings describing both days.) Ephraim is right there when Jackson is almost done in, being one of the 2,000 men who held off Jackson & his 7-8,000 men for 3 hours. Tomorrow I include NYT coverage of these two days, the battles June 8 (Cross Keys) and June 9 (Port Republic). See also June 13 for more NYT.

(note: doodle top of page: five lines crossed like they’re kindling, like sticks again; three horizontal lines cut in half by four vertical)

June Sunday 8 1862

Quite a fine morning. The sun came up bright and I find myself a soldier in the U.S. army and away down in the State of Virginia Page Co. There is no Sabbath day here in the army and very little Preaching. We were roused up last night at 12oclock to march on as our advance was marching on that is the cavalry and we had to follow up which was 10 miles to Port Republic. We marched on. The 4 Brigade 7 Indiana 1^st Va 84 & 110 Penn V.I. now the only forces that was along with 4 pieces of brass cannon and a small squad of cavalry. Our Brgt Gen Carroll went into the town this morning. Made a dash cleard the bridge and soon crossed the bridge planted 2 cannon on the East side and they had a good possition and we had not and we had no rifle cannon** here at that time. Only think of Gen Carroll attacking about 20000 of the enemy with about 1000 men in all of ours. They had some 30 cannon and long range ones. Our men keep up the fire for sometime. They captured the 2 brass cannon that was on the west side. There was a good many killed out of the 7 Ind Regt. There was some 6 or 8 horses killed and 2 Artillary men killed. This fireing took place about 8oclock in the morning. We were reinforced by Gen Tyler in the afternoon by some 2000 men Infantry. We had to fall back some distance 2 miles when Tylers Brigade came up. We fell back on the ground the only place where we could make a stand. We also was reinforced by one Battary of 6 Parrot cannon long range a Regular Battary. Biovouacked for the night on the ground that we intend making a stand***

Gen. Carroll to Gen. Jackson: What’s good? 

*“and I find myself a soldier in the U.S. army and away down in the State of Virginia….” Such voice. Ephraim wrote two pages today. The featured image is page 1, & page two is at the top of this page. For the pencil maps he drew about today & tomorrow, see end of this entry.

**For sale: 2.9″ PARROTT RIFLE – 10 POUNDER – FULL SCALE $4,517.00 https://hernironworks.com/product/29parrotrifle10lbsfs/

Note: https://civilwarmonths.com/2017/06/08/the-battle-of-cross-keys/

https: //www.shenandoahatwar.org/battle-of-cross-keys

https://www.angelfire.com/va3/valleywar/battle/crosskeys.html

***Echoing the words of Captain John Parker in 1775, 77 Minutemen against 700 British at Lexington: “Stand your ground. Don’t fire unless fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here.”

Note: Sketch of Cross Keys: https://www.loc.gov/item/99446760/

Note: Ephraim states twice that Gen. Carroll crossed the bridge. Unfortunately for the historical record, Robert K. Krick states, on page 61 of Conquering the Valley, that Carroll did not cross the bridge. Because Krick was not there, & my grandfather was, I’ll go with my grandfather’s account. Krick’s histrionic writing– like a 6^th grader passing notes about an enemy– is an example of how inaccurate the most basic record surrounding the Civil War can be.

For Gallagher & Nolan on Krick’s writing (also in June 21 here) see The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, Editors P. 17 “The Anatomy of the Myth” Alan T. Nolan P. 137-138

“However, no present-day historian has attacked Longstreet’s performance at Gettysburg more than Robert K. Krick. In a volume of essays by various scholars on the second day’s battle, Krick describes Longstreet as “small minded and mean spirited,” with a “tincture of the dullard.” The author quotes Armistead Long of Lee’s staff– “what can detain Longstreet,” Lee said to Long– but places the comment out of the proper chronological sequence on that day. Krick further colors his characterization of Longstreet by using the words “sullen” and “sulking” to indicate Longstreet’s temperament. His portrait of Longstreet is harsh, unleavened by countervailing evidence.”

Note: You can see how this happens; century after century this is how it happens, that salty line demarcating what was from what wasn’t. When Osprey Publishing forwarded my email (the first week of June 2018) to Krick to see if he’d like to read a new first-person account that contradicts his page 61, crickets. See below, the reason for & importance of accurate historical information: “It might determine where Stonewall Jackson was at a certain time of day during an important day in his life so all those things ought to be kept.” In this case, where Carroll was. For more on preserving history, Shelby Foote has this to say when a woman calls in to a show where Foote is being interviewed, and asks him about seven letters passed down to her that her 2xgrandfather wrote in 1864, letters that mention Sherman moving from Savannah. She says, “They ought to be some place other than in my desk. What is your advice if you held such letters that you know names, specific locations, and generals and so forth, what would you do with them?” “Shelby Foote In-depth 3 hour Interview” video on YouTube (minute 2:56.00)

Foote: “The first thing you should do is take them to a real good reproducer, get ’em, get good copies made of ’em, you can go to many of these places. You make good copies and get that and that secures the safety from losing ’em entirely, then the original copy ought to be in your department of archives and history in whatever state you’re in. Those things are very important; sometimes little things in ’em that seem to matter not at all are very important to historians. It might determine where Stonewall Jackson was at a certain time of day during an important day in his life so all those things ought to be kept. Many of ’em say for goodness sake, send me a blanket, I’m freezing to death, and things like that, but there’s surprisingly interesting things to be gotten out of those letters too.”

The Historian’s Craft Marc Bloch (1953) P. 67

“History is not yet what it ought to be. That is no reason to make history as it can be the scapegoat for the sins which belong to bad history alone.”

Note: Back to 1862:

The Civil War Battlefield Guide Francis H. Kennedy P. 85

“The Massanutten Mountain separates the Shenandoah and Luray Valleys. Through the Luray Valley, running between the Blue Ridge Mountains on the east and the Massanutten on the west, is the South Fork of the Shenandoah River, which in June 1862 was spanned by three bridges upstream from Front Royal: two near Luray and one at Conrad’s Store (now Elkton). Jackson’s cavalry destroyed each of these bridges, thus separating Frémont’s and Shields’s forces. The next closest point of crossing was at Port Republic. Where the North and South rivers meet to form the South Fork. Two fords crossed the South River here, and a bridge arched the rain-swollen North River at the northern end of town.”

The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville Shelby Foote P. 460

“…and a cavalryman came galloping with alarming news. The Federals had forded the South River, scattering the pickets, and were entering the town! “Go back and fight them,” Jackson snapped. He mounted and rode hard for the North River bridge, clattering across the long wooden structure just in time. A colonel and a lieutenant who brought up the rear were cut off and captured.

Gaining the heights, which overlooked the town, Jackson ordered his batteries to open fire on the bluecoats in the streets below, and sent two brigades of infantry to clear them out at the point of the bayonet. It was smartly done; the Federals fell back in haste, abandoning a fieldpiece and the prisoners they had taken. Stonewall, peering down from the ridge as his men advanced across the bridge and through the smoke that hung about the houses, dropped the reins on his horse’s neck and lifted both hands above his head, palms outward. When the men looked up and saw him stark against the sky, invoking the blessing of the God of battle, they cheered with all their might. The roar of it reached him there on the heights, and the cannoneers swelled the chorus.

As the cheering subsided, the men on the ridge became aware of a new sound: the rumble and boom of cannon, swelling from the direction of Cross Keys. It was Frémont, responding to Shields’ request that he “thunder down.” Going forward, however, he struck not Jackson’s rear but Ewell’s front. The first contact, after a preliminary bombardment, was on the Confederate right,*** where Ewell had posted a Virginia brigade along a low ridge overlooking some fields of early grain. Frémont came on with unaccustomed vigor, a regiment of New Yorkers in the lead, their boots crunching the young stalks of buckwheat. As they started up the slope there was a sudden crash of gunfire from the crest and the air was full of bullets. A second volley thinned the ranks of the survivors as they tried to re-form their shattered line. They fell back, what was left of them. Frémont, reverting to the form he had shown at Strasburg, settled down to long-range fighting with his artillery, which was skillfully handled. Out in the buckwheat the wounded New Yorkers lay under this fire, crying for water. Their cries decreased as the day wore on and Frémont continued his cannonade.

In essence that was all there was to the Battle of Cross Keys.”

Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War Richard Taylor New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1879 P. 72-73

“Ewell, in immediate charge at Cross Keys, was ready early in the morning of the 8^th, when Frémont attacked. The ground was undulating, with much wood, and no extended view could be had. In my front the attack, if such it could be called, was feeble in the extreme—an affair of skirmishers, in which the enemy yielded to the slightest pressure. A staff officer of Jackson’s, in hot haste, came with orders from his chief to march my brigade double-quick to Port Republic. Elzey’s brigade, in second line to the rear, was asked to take my place and relieve my skirmishers; then, advising the staff officer to notify Ewell, whom he had not seen, we started on the run, for such a message from Jackson meant business. Two of the intervening miles were quickly passed, when another officer appeared with orders to halt. In half an hour, during which the sound of battle at Cross Keys thickened, Jackson came…. He had passed the night in the village, with his staff and escort. Up as usual at dawn, he started alone to recross the bridge, leaving his people to follow. The bridge was a few yards below the last house in the village, and some mist overhung the river. Under cover of this a small body of horse, with one gun, from Shields’s [sic] forces, had reached the east end of the bridge and trained the gun on it. Jackson was within an ace of capture. As he spurred across, the gun was fired on him, but without effect, and the sound brought up staff and escort, when the horse retired north. This incident occasioned the order to me. After relating it (all save his own danger), Jackson passed on to Ewell. Thither I followed, to remain in reserve until the general foreward movement in the afternoon, by which Frémont was driven back with loss of prisoners. We did not persist far, as Shields’s [sic] force was near upon us.”

Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command Douglas Southall Freeman Scribner, 1942 P. 448

“Jackson’s reasoning was prompt and decisive: He was nearer Shields than Frémont; he had reason to believe Shields commanded the smaller of the two Union forces; in the vicinity of Port Republic Jackson was closer to his base of supplies and to a road over the mountains in the event of defeat. Finally, if he beat Frémont, that officer would have an easy line of retreat down the Valley Pike, while Shields had a bad road to follow back to Luray. All the weight of advantage was on the side of dealing first with Shields. He should be attacked heavily and should be driven back. If that were done early, while Frémont was being held at Cross Keys, might it not be possible to return to Port Republic, cross the bridge and assail Frémont? It was worth trying! Should events preclude a battle against Frémont, after Shields had been beaten, then the destruction of the bridge across the North River would leave Frémont powerless to force action or even to attempt quick pursuit.”

Note: Shields condemns Carroll for not burning the bridge today at Port Republic. However, Shields apparently forgot a mere 5 days earlier he told Carroll to “go forward at once with the cavalry and and guns to save the bridge.” On top of all this, literally, Carroll’s horse landed on top of him. See below passage from the O.R., Testimony of General Irvin McDowell.

Rebel Yell: The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson S.C. Gwynne Excerpts P. 315-321

“But Port Republic, like so many of Jackson’s choices of positions in the war, then and later, was actually a terrific tactical play. Its beauty lay in the fact that it offered both the protection of a roaring river and an escape hatch if things went wrong. Its best feature, tactically speaking, was a sturdy covered bridge over the rampaging North River. This was the fourth bridge. In the absence of the others, it was the only way for either army to cross the river. If Frémont beat him on the battlefield, he could easily retreat over the North River and burn the bridge. East of town there was the South River, breast-high and moving like a millrace but still fordable or bridgeable with pontoons or wagons. It separated him from Shields’s oncoming army. If he lost that fight, he could recross the lesser stream and head to Brown’s Gap a few miles away on a good road that ran south out of town.

On the morning of June 8 Jackson’s army looked like this: Its headquarters was in the small village of Port Republic. Seven thousand men under his direct command were camped outside of town just north of the North River, while Ewell’s five-thousand-man force was camped about four miles north at a hamlet known as Cross Keys.

Facing Ewell across a gently swelling farmland covered by wheat, clover, patches of timber, and the occasional picturesque farmhouse were twelve thousand bluecoats under Frémont in full battle lines and ready for a fight. To the east, bogged down in muck and mire downstream near Conrad’s Store, lurked Shields’s brigades.”

Note: Jackson left no guards on the North River Bridge. He also ordered army supplies parked nearby, completely visible to the enemy.

P. 316

“An advance unit from Shields had only to cross the fordable South River to get at them. Worse still, loss of the North Bridge would mean that Jackson’s army and its supplies were on opposite sides of the unfordable river. Indeed, Jackson himself might have been separated from his own army.”

Note: Ephraim is right there when Jackson is almost done in, being one of the 2k men holding off Jackson & his 8k men.

P. 317

“At about 8:30 a.m. on the dry, mild morning of June 8, approximately 150 cavalry with four guns under the command of Colonel Samuel Carroll forded the South River, galloped into Port Republic, and created an astounding amount of havoc in a short time, capturing three staff officers and nearly taking Jackson himself, who escaped only by a mad gallop the length of the main street and over the North River bridge. The immediate result of the assault was that Carroll’s raiders suddenly found themselves in possession of that bridge. It was Jackson’s worst nightmare. Carroll had only to burn the bridge and Jackson and his army would be cut off from his supply trains and his escape routes. Frémont would have him cornered against the rampaging North River.

P. 318

And then something miraculous happened. Carroll, who might have changed the war and made himself a hero by burning the bridge, was actually determined to hold it. That was because his superior, Major General James Shields, had explicitly ordered him, in writing, to do so. It was one of the campaign’s greatest tactical mistakes, and it is still not clear how Shields could have been so foolish. In keeping with his character- he was a chronic liar- Shields later blamed it all on Carroll, who by “some unaccountable misapprehension” had failed to burn the bridge. Shields, in reality, had not been able to make up his mind and had given at least one set of conflicting orders, though his final order was clear enough: “Hold it at all hazards.” Carroll did, until he and the rest of his little group– plus some infantry that had remained in the rear– were chased off by a determined Jackson backed by two regiments and artillery.

Still, why would Shields have ordered Carroll to, as Union general Nathan Kimball later put it, “hold the only bridge over which Jackson could possibly escape from Frémont?” The real reason may have been petty jealousy, which would also have been in keeping with Shields’s deeply deficient character. According to an Ohio soldier, on the previous day Shields had said in a voice “loud and rather sarcastic, ‘Frémont thinks he is going to raise hell up there, and I’ll show him.’” The idea was that Frémont wanted the bridge burned to trap Jackson; Shields wanted to deny Frémont that glory. Kimball, generally a reliable source, later made the same accusation.

P. 320

The cannonade began at Cross Keys at 10:30 a.m., roared for six full hours, and consisted mostly of shooting at other batteries.

There was plenty of hardnosed fighting on both sides, too, men standing in the open and loading and firing and stepping or inching forward depending on the flow of the battle.

Why a particular regiment of soldiers advanced or retreated at this and other battles in the Civil War is still something of a mystery. At bottom, fighting was about the ability to hurl enough lead at a concentrated group of soldiers so that, seeing enough of their friends go down, they became convinced they had to withdraw. Often it was just that simple. At other times the effects of musket fire were almost imperceptible, as much the result of a soldier’s belief in his chances of survival as of the actual danger he faced. Belief counted for a lot– in one’s general, in the captain in front of you brandishing his gleaming sword, in the bravery of one’s fellow soldiers, in the idea of winning itself. A rout might start with men taking small steps backward while reloading, then taking slightly larger steps backward while their enemy, two hundred or three hundred yards away, began to move very slightly forward. Soon the retreating line would begin to lose individual soldiers, then groups of them, and finally the entire line would turn and run– all without ever experiencing a single definitive moment when the battle turned.

P. 321

Jackson, meanwhile, spent most of the day in Port Republic, fully expecting Shields to follow up on Carroll’s attack. Jackson spent time placing artillery on the bluffs that overlooked the village– enough to be sure that he could stop Shields if he tried another attack across the South River.”

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War U.S. Congress 1863 Part One: Army of the Potomac. P. 269

6/27/1862 Testimony of General Irvin McDowell

“Question: By the way, was Colonel Carroll ordered not to burn the bridge near Port Republic?

Answer: Yes, sir; by General Shields. He was ordered to save the bridge.

Question: Ordered to do so by General Shields?

Answer: As I see from extracts of letters from General Shields to him.”

Note: Ephraim is one of the men in the two brigades 20 miles ahead of the rest of the Union Army which means they are independently operating away from the mass of men, to their rear. The two brigades are camped tonight, in Ephraim’s words, “on the ground we intend making a stand.” Below, Ecelbarger refers to the land as “the morrow’s killing fields.” Note too Jackson figured Shields’ men would roll over easy, but it turns out Shields’ men were the only Union soldiers Jackson couldn’t beat. Ephraim’s group of men go down in history as the ones who got away. Note as well Ecelbarger mentions Lincoln’s visit May 23 (where Ephraim was present, & saw Lincoln). The men who kicked Jackson’s ass had walked– in a starving condition– with heavy packs, almost 400 miles in 25 days, & many in bare feet:

We Are In For It! The First Battle of Kernstown Gary L. Ecelbarger P. 230-231

Note: All italics added by me, NOT Ecelbarger, plus the red, obv.:

“Jackson’s Valley District had been reinforced by Major General Richard Ewell. At full strength they numbered over 15,000 effectives. These troops had enjoyed a campaign that had embarrassed opposing forces for the previous forty days. After losing at Kernstown, Jackson and his men enjoyed success through rapid maneuvers and hard-spirited fighting to come away victorious at McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester, and Cross Keys. Stonewall Jackson, on the verge of completing a campaign that placed him among military legends, planned to cross the river and whip Shields’s men to add another link to what since Kernstown had been an unbroken chain of victories. Jackson’s successes had been achieved at the expense of several independently operating, but hapless Federal forces that proved to be “no contest” against his fast-moving, powerful, and confident army.

Those hapless Federals that Jackson and his men rolled over had never included Shields’s division. Detached from Banks in mid-May and sent to General McDowell, Shields’s division reorganized into four brigades had arrived at Falmouth (across the river from Fredericksburg) on May 22, where they were reviewed by President Lincoln the next day. Instead of joining McDowell’s men in the advance toward Richmond, the Westerners received unexpected orders to return to the Valley when General Banks was swept from Winchester on May 25 and sent fleeing across the Potomac River to the safety of the Maryland shore. Shields’s men re-entered the Valley at Front Royal as May turned to June. Advancing up the muddied and winding main road of the Page Valley, two brigades of Shields’s division advanced ahead of the remaining command and found themselves near Port Republic– twenty miles ahead of the rest of the division. Arriving there on June 8, these two brigades, under the commands of Colonel Carroll and General Erastus Tyler, bivouacked that night on the morrow’s killing fields. A private in the 7^th Indiana accurately predicted that the calm of the late spring night would last only until daylight.

Though always confident, the men in those two Federal brigades were in the same fighting condition as Jackson’s men had been two and one-half months earlier at Kernstown. Numbering fewer than 3,000 men, fatigued from marching nearly 400 miles in twenty-five days, hungry and barefoot, the men in Shields’s two advanced brigades faced the foreboding sight of Jackson’s larger and healthier army advancing against them in the hazy June morning. For the 84^th Pennsylvania, the similarity between the pending fight to that of the potential disaster that faced them at Bath five months earlier must have been stupefying. This day, as on January 4, the 84^th Pennsylvania and the remaining Union force were outnumbered by more than 5,000 men, lacked sufficient supplies, and faced disaster.

No military force could have been more ill-prepared to fight.”

Note: ? Out of all the men throughout the entire Civil War? Big if true.

Conquering the Valley Robert K. Krick P. 53

“The last moment of calm for Jackson’s thousands of relaxed Confederates expired at about eight-thirty A.M. Men looking back through the subsequent tumult timed its beginning from “very soon after sunrise” to as late as ten A.M. The usually reliable Jedediah Hotchkiss reported that late hour. The great majority of the estimates, however, fall between eight and nine o’clock. General Winder, whose diary habitually reported times faithfully to the nearest quarter hour hour, declared that the uproar broke out at “about 8:30 A.M.”

That Jackson’s army could have been so thoroughly surprised seemed at the time, and still seems in retrospect, absolutely astonishing.

P.55

Assigning blame lay in the unimaginable future at eight-thirty on the morning of June 8– a luxury available to survivors. Jackson and the several score Confederates in the village of Port Republic had no certainty that they would be among that fortunate number at the frantic moment when suddenly Yankees seemed to be everywhere. Colonel Carroll’s carefully set stage exploded into action when his artillery opened fire. The conventional picture painted over the years by historians describing the raid on Port Republic has made the Federal cavalry dash concurrent with the artillery barrage. Carroll would have been much more successful, particularly in corralling Jackson and his headquarters, had that been the case. The artillery fire actually preceded the cavalry across the river by enough minutes to give the Confederates some reaction time. A local historian summarized the Federal predicament when he concluded that they had “unexpectedly surprised themselves by surprising Jackson.”

Note: Okay, Krick, but Carroll crossed that bridge this morning to plant cannons. Should he have not? Our Brgt Gen Carroll went into the town this morning. Made a dash cleard the bridge and soon crossed the bridge planted 2 cannon on the East side and they had a good possition and we had not and we had no rifle cannon here at that time. Only think of Gen Carroll attacking about 20000 of the enemy with about 1000 men in all of ours. Nothing like Monday morning quarterbacking. From the 21^st century, no less. You try being in our 1k up against 20k in the shape we were in today… Wouldn’t this be the place in the book for Krick to say something positive about all us? Did not today show who the 110^th & 84^th were under deadly pressure? Ephraim writing from the dead.

The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, Editors (2000) P. 198-199 “The Immortal Confederacy” Lloyd A. Hunter

“Dabney observed him at at Cross Keys, dropping the reins upon his horse’s neck and raising “both his hands toward the heavens while the fire of battle in his face changed into a look of reverential awe. Even while he prayed, the God of battles heard; or ever he had withdrawn his uplifted hands the bridge was gained, and the enemy’s gun was captured.

But it was the fact that Jackson never lived to see Confederate victory that sealed his image.”

In the Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War in the Heart of America, 1859-1864 Edward Ayers P. 268-269

“Jackson could have left the Valley. At his back lay Brown’s Gap, a pass through the Blue Ridge Mountains with the security of Charlottesville on the other side. Instead he waited with fifteen thousand soldiers. And he almost lost them. The U.S. Forces sought to attack at Port Republic and Cross Keys at the same time, and on June 8 a sudden rain of artillery surprised the Southerners at Port Republic. Only Jackson’s destruction of the bridges in the area kept the Federals from coordinating the assault and overwhelming the Confederate forces in the Valley. Staunton was filled with fear and false reports. “The probability of Jackson’s leaving the Valley is talked about,” Waddell breathlessly noted. “Staunton will be occupied by the enemy, of course, in that event.’”

How the South Could Have Won the Civil War: The Fatal Errors That Led to Confederate Defeat Bevin Alexander P. 74

“When the contest began on the morning of June 8, the Union advance party scattered Jackson’s cavalry vedettes, crossed the South River at the ford, captured part of Jackson’s staff and nearly captured Jackson, and threatened the army ammunition train parked just west of the village. Barely escaping over the bridge to the hill above the North River, Jackson hurriedly pulled up artillery that pounded the Union horsemen. A quickly organized infantry assault across the bridge then drove the Federals back across the South River, freeing the captives.”

Note: And then, this happens:

Touched by Fire: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Harold Holzer P. 333 Editor’s Note bottom of page

(Note: this regards June 8)

“The first Confederate assault was made by Winder’s (Stonewall) brigade, and was repulsed by the troops of Carroll’s brigade. An incident of the counter-charge is thus described by Colonel Henry B. Kelly, C.S.A.:

“While victoriously driving back the line of the Confederates left, the advancing Federal infantry were themselves suddenly assailed in flank, on their left, by a charge of two regiments of Virginia infantry, the 44^th and 58^th, led by Colonel Scott.”

The attack on the other flank of troops brought up from Cross Keys, by General Ewell, determined the result. Colonel Kelly says:

“At the word of command, the line moved forward, soon coming into plain view of the batteries and of the infantry of the enemy beyond the ravine, which at once opened fire on the advancing brigade. With one volley in reply, and a Confederate yell heard far over the field, the Louisianians rushed down the rough declivity and across the ravine, and carried the batteries like a flash…. By the impetus of the charge over the rough ground all formation was lost, and officers and men were all thrown into one unorganized mass around the captured guns. While this exultant crowd were rejoicing and shouting over their victory, suddenly a scathing fire of canister was poured into them by a section of Clark’s battery which had been rapidly brought over from the Federal right to within two hundred yards of the position of the captured guns….

“At the outset of the attempt of the Federals to retake their batteries, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, of the 9^th Louisiana, called out to the men about the captured guns to shoot the horses**, which was done. When, therefore, the Federals retook and held for a time, as they did, the ground where the guns were, they were unable, when again driven off, to take more than one gun with them for want of battery horses.’”

Note: What (& I do mean this whole-heartedly & cannot stress it enough) the fuck. This…. is something. True theater of the absurd. Poor planning, poor execution, poor everything. You have to wonder about men like this. Really really wonder about Americans. The deranged unasinous malice. 

Note: Pleased to meet you. Hope you know my name.

For more on horses, see 3/23, 3/28, 4/14, 4/22, 4/25, 5/2, 5/5, esp. 5/28, 6/3, 6/8, 6/12, 6/19, July 2, 3, etc. Also, Majestic Mounts: The Bond Between Horse and Soldier: Through fire and fury, fighting men formed special bonds with their war horses, by John Banks, published 8/26/21.  

Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era James McPherson P. 458

“On June 8, Frémont’s troops advanced against Ewell’s division stationed three miles north of Port Republic near the tiny village of Cross Keys. Frémont handled this attack poorly. Although outnumbering Ewell by 11,000 to 6,000, he committed only a fraction of his infantry to an attack on the Confederate right. After its repulse, Frémont settled down for an artillery duel that accomplished nothing. Reacting to this feeble effort, Jackson made a typically bold decision. His army of 15,000 was caught between two enemy forces whose combined strength he believed to be at least 50 percent greater than his own. The safe course was retreat to the nearest defensible pass in the Blue Ridge. But the two Federal armies under Frémont and Shields were separated by unfordable rivers, while Jackson’s troops held the only bridge. On the night of June 8-9, Jackson ordered Ewell to leave a token force confronting Frémont and march the rest of his division to Port Republic. Jackson intended to overwhelm Shields’s advance force and then face about to attack Frémont. But the stubborn resistance of Shields’s two brigades at Port Republic frustrated the plan. Three thousand bluecoats held off for three hours the seven or eight thousand men that Jackson finally got into action. The weight of numbers eventually prevailed, but by then Jackson’s army was too battered to carry out the attack against Frémont, who had remained quiescent during this bloody morning of June 9. Both sides pulled back and regrouped. That night Jackson withdrew to Brown’s Gap in the Blue Ridge.”

Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command Douglas Southall Freeman Scribner, 1942 P. 461-462

“Obedient to Jackson’s orders, they had left their line near Cross Keys between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M., had crossed the North River bridge at 10 o’clock and had burned it fifteen minutes later. Frémont, following fast, had found no way of crossing or of giving help to Shields, and had opened from the ridge a fire that had no other effect than to drive off the ambulances and the stretcher-bearers who were searching for the wounded.

A close action this Battle of Port Republic had been, and a costly! The Federals, it developed, comprised two small Brigades that numbered no more than 3000 men, and sixteen guns. The infantry, under Brig. Gen. E.B. Tyler and Col. S.S. Carroll, acting Brigadier, were from Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia and Indiana, and they fought admirably. Those fine guns on the coaling had been three of Clark’s regulars, 4^th U.S. Artillery, three of Huntington’s and one of Robinson’s Ohio batteries. The combined force of eight infantry regiments, three batteries and 150 cavalry had been hurried forward by General Shields in an attempt to reach Waynesboro, where he thought there were a depot and a bridge, the destruction of which would be fatal to Jackson. It had been the advanced units of this column, led by Colonel Carroll, that had entered Port Republic on the 8^th. Upon his retirement, Carroll had reached the van of General Tyler, who had pushed forward to his support. Tyler, perhaps injudiciously, had decided to remain in his advanced position overnight. Early in the morning of the 9^th, he had received orders from Shields to retire to Conrad’s Store, but before he could do so, Jackson had been upon him. In the battle itself, Tyler’s killed and wounded were few. On his retreat he had lost about 20 percent of his force as prisoners. His total casualties were 1018. The remnant that made its way back to Luray was in sad plight. Jackson, for his part, had suffered in excess of 800 casualties, which were more than he had sustained in any other action of the campaign.”

Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer Jedediah Hotchkiss P. 53-54

“Sunday, June 8^th. About 10 A.M. of today, while some of us were quietly in our tents and the General and a portion of the staff were on the point of going over to the army across the North River, the Yankee cavalry and flying artillery, from down the river, made a dash upon Port Republic, our picket running away but some few coming through the town. The enemy appeared opposite Port Republic, across South River, and began firing at such of our men as they could see, and especially at the bridge guard, while a portion of them crossed near the factory. As his horse was not ready, and went into the town, and when the others came on. Capt. A. S. Pendleton, Col. Wm. L. Jackson, Lt. J. K. Boswell, Lt. Edward Willis and Col. Crutchfield, and some one brought him his horse, he mounted and they all rode rapidly towards and through the bridge; but the enemy caught Willis and Crutchfield who were in the rear of the party. Our bridge guard was then firing at the enemy across the main Shenandoah River below the bridge, and the Yankee artillery, below Mrs. Yost’s on Charles Lewis’ land, opened on our troops and on the bridge. Soon as General Jackson had reached the other side of the bridge he sent Col. Jackson and Lt. Boswell to see where the enemy was; he remaining on the bluff above New Haven. Col. Jackson went to the end of the bridge and the enemy fired on him from its southern end and through the bridge; Boswell went up the river and saw them across North River and reported to the General, he then went and motioned to them, shouting, “Go away from that bridge. Go away from that bridge,” and they went away. Shortly afterwards they brought up a piece of artillery and planted it at the Port Republic end of the bridge. The General thought it was ours, one of Courtney’s guns, though Lt. Boswell assured him that it was the enemy’s. To convince himself the General went to the top of the bank and beckoned, and called out; “Bring that gun over this side.” They at once opened on him with canister, one shot, that killed one of our men; then the 7^th Va., Col. Fulkerson’s came up and opened on the Yankees and drove them from their gun, killing one of them. They then fled across the river. Just then 4 regiments of Yankee infantry came up to near Mrs. Yost’s house, and we opened on them with 10 pieces of artillery, from the hill on the opposite bank of the Shenandoah River, when they retreated, both infantry and cavalry.

The battle raged furiously and lasted until nearly dark. We drove the enemy’s left wing from the field and repulsed all their attacks on us with great loss to them but comparatively small loss to us.

Our cavalry was on the south side of South River; the trains came over through Port Republic and went up towards Mt. Meridian and were parked there. The battle raged over a wide space; we had 30 killed and 270 wounded; the loss of the enemy was much greater.”

Conquering the Valley Robert K. Krick P. 192

Note: Tom Hightower of the 21^st Georgia in a letter home: “’The balls whistle by our heads as fast and thick as ever I saw hail fall in Georgia.” and another soldier wrote, “it was the heardest fight, every has been fought in Virginia.’”

Living Hell: The Dark Side of the Civil War Michael C.C. Adams P. 88

“Hogs also ate the living. At Cross Keys, Virginia, on June 8, 1862, Major R.L. Dabney, chaplain to the Stonewall brigade, recorded that corpses, “with some, perchance, of the mangled living, were partially devoured by swine before their burial. Being eaten haunted Confederate veteran Thomas J. Key: “It is dreadful to contemplate being killed on the field of battle without a kind hand to hide one’s remains from the eye of the world or the gnawing of animals and buzzards.”

Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War Richard Taylor New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1879 P. 73

“In the evening we moved to the river and camped. Winder’s and other brigades crossed the bridge, and during the night Ewell, with most of the army, drew near, leaving Trimble’s brigade and the horse at Cross Keys. No one apprehended another advance by Frémont.”

Terrible Swift Sword Bruce Catton P. 319-320

“….Washington was a little harder to fool than it used to be. On the day Jackson turned back Frémont’s assault at Cross Keys, Mr. Lincoln told Stanton that Richmond after all was the focal point, that Confederate activities elsewhere in the east were nothing more than attempts to divert attention, and that hereafter it would be wise to stand on the defensive in the valley; Frémont and Banks could hold that area, and McDowell, once he got his command reassembled, should be sent down to McClellan. A week later the President wrote to Frémont that “Jackson’s game—his assigned work—now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to…. Our game is not to allow this.’”

*I find myself a soldier… as if Ephraim’s writing for an audience, or trying to come to terms with his situation.

**What kind of a person comes up with a plan like this and carries it out?

***He notes here that the men came on his left flank; the Confederate right would have been on the Union left. All reports & maps of the battle confirm this, including Ephraim’s own hand-drawn map (see below), description of cannon placements & final capture. Ephraim is very exacting in his details. He includes The Coaling. With handling over the years, his map has broken apart into two pieces. When he drew this, it was one page, & he drew on both sides. I took these pictures outside in sunlight.

Note: In the back pocket of the diary, Ephraim stuck a map on thick paper that was not torn from the diary; he may have torn it from some kind of an account ledger, because there are, in addition to blue lines, red lines both horizontal and vertical running down one far side of the page. 12½ inches by 8, and it’s ripped, barely holding together, having been folded 160 years ago in seven places: once lengthwise, and three times width. Drawn maps are on both sides in pencil.

Note: Today’s battle on zoomable map: www.loc.gov/resource/g3884p.cwh00096/

https://bantarleton.tumblr.com/post/183383682150/the-battle-of-port-republic-june-9-1862-by-adam

https://www.nps.gov/cebe/learn/historyculture/battle-of-port-republic.htm

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/port-republic

Side 1: “Battle ground near Port Republic– June 8 & 9 1862.” Squiggly lines draw cannons, trees, houses, trees, hills, He wrote, “rising ground, enemy cannon, rising ground, 3 Regts enemies, 7 Indiana Regiment, 2 pieces of cannon, clear fields, 3 Brigade joined [illeg. because the lead has faded; maybe “brick”], house.

Side 2: The map flipped over: “Gen Carroll, Gen Tyler, Fought June 8 & 9 by 3000 USA + 25,000 C.S.” “25,000 CS” has a squiggly line box cutting it off from the rest of the page. His words in the map around the drawings: “woods, opposite side of river toward Harrisburg, Infantry, enemys cannon, drawing of the cannons (and repeating word “cannon”), Road from Leurey to Port Republic, woods, clear land, 7 Indiana Regt, grain, “Buck” or “Brick” house, Parrott cannon, grain fields, hill or mountain (he wasn’t decided on size), 3 Regts C.S.” and a large round circle that likely was the coaling, but he left it unidentified as such. Two tiny houses are drawn, cannons, squiggly line trees. More lines, dots, stacks of lines, trees, ground, large splotches of circles, squares, triangles. It’s all what stood out the most to him that day.

Note: Frémont and Shields could have taken Jackson out today, enveloped him. They didn’t. Frémont had more troops. Frémont fails. Cross Keys was mainly a Frémont fight in the end analysis. But they put up one hell of a fight.

The Union had 11,500, the Confederacy 5,800, yet the Union lost. This fact is an excellent illustration of how sheer numbers are not the deciding factor in a battle outcome. Union casualties: 557 killed, 100 captured. Confederates lost less than 300. Of course, it depends on which figures you go with, like any battle in the war.

Trimble tries for a night battle, asks Jackson for permission to keep it all going, but Jackson says no, go ask Ewell. So that night, instead, Jackson has all his men roll across the North River bridge, camp out, and cook up some supper.

Note: Carroll was just 29 years old. He commands the entire 4^th Brigade of General Shields’ Division. He was beloved by his men, who referred to themselves as “Sam Carroll’s men.” More on Carroll:

The Generals of Gettysburg: the Leaders of America’s Greatest Battle Larry Tagg P. (none given in google books)

Note: In charge of 977 men (Ephraim being one), Tagg writes of Colonel Samuel Sprigg Carroll (Excerpts):

“‘Sam Carroll’s nickname was “Old Brick Top,” because of his thinning red hair (which was accented by by a huge pair of side-whiskers). He was a fearless and vigorous brigade leader, and one who would attack “wherever [he] got the chance, and of [his] own accord.”

Although the Civil War began in April of 1861, West Point did not release Carroll for field duty until the fall. By December he was the colonel of the 8^th Ohio regiment, and he joined this command in Romney, West Virginia. He performed well in his first battle at Kernstown during the opening of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Valley Campaign in March of 1862, and was commended for his actions by division commander Brig. Gen. James Shields. Ont he basis of his performance at Kernstown, he was given command of a brigade in May, and on June 9 led it into a fight for the first time at Port Republic, where the Union forces were defeated by Jackson. This time General Shields sharply condemned the young officer: “Colonel Carroll neglected to burn the bridge at Port Republic….He held it three-quarters of an hour and wanted the good sense to burn it. They took up an indefensible position afterward instead of a defensible one.” (Shields neglected to mention that five days earlier he had expressly ordered Carroll to “go forward at once with the cavalry and guns to save the bridge at Port Republic.”) To add injury to insult, Carroll was hurt during the battle when his wounded horse fell on him.

Despite having lead brigades in several battles (Port Republic, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville), and earning the commendation of of his superiors, Sam Carroll was still a colonel by the time the Gettysburg Campaign opened. Perhaps his lack of promotion was due to the black mark of Shields’ scathing Port Republic report. Whatever the reason, it is no credit to the promotional machinery of the Army of the Potomac that a West Point-trained veteran brigade commander like Carroll was still a colonel in the summer of 1863. He was a man possessed with dash and gallantry, and his soldiers liked to identify themselves as “Sam Carroll’s men,” which says much about his leadership.

In 1869, Carroll Carroll was retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of major general for disability arising from his war wounds. He lived in or near his native Washington, D.C., until his death from pneumonia in 1893.”

Rebel Yell: The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson S.C. Gwynne P. 321

“The news of Ewell’s victory at Cross Keys thrilled Jackson’s men. They had been attacked by Frémont’s full army, had struck a hard blow in return, and had driven him back. More important, as far as Jackson’s staff was concerned, was the meaning of the victory. With Frémont checked and Shields not yet in evidence, they all believed that Jackson would now do the supremely logical thing: slip out under cover of darkness, take his exhausted army on the road for Brown’s Gap, and call an end to the long campaign. They had underestimated their commander once again. That evening he amazed them all by ordering his quartermaster, John Harman, to bring up the supply wagons, roll them across the North River bridge, and give the troops rations to cook. They were going to stay and fight. Among his staff members there was a good deal of eye-rolling and looks exchanged. “The General seemed to like traps,” wrote Henry Kyd Douglas, “and, at any rate, was not yet satisfied with the risks he had run and the blows he had inflicted. . . . We were getting used to this kind of aberration, but this did seem rather an extra piece of temerity.” And so the huge supply train rumbled forward; campfires were lit; and, likely to the astonishment of Shields and Frémont, no Confederates showed any signs of leaving Port Republic.”

Note: According to https://www.shenandoahatwar.org/history/battle-of-cross-keys today’s forces engaged: Frémont: 11,500, with 664 casualties. Ewell: 5,800 with 287 casualties.

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on the ground that we intend making a stand….

The sun rises at 4:51am today, with Winder’s Brigade crossing the Shenandoah River just before 5am. Today & tomorrow call for scattered dust, seepage of blood, gizzards, steak tartare with bodies laying down like a wax anatomy exhibit, not the living people you had breakfast with. Meringue. It calls for Jackson & his double switchback tricks, shotgun resting on his shoulder, blood in his teeth again, Jackson all foamed up. He needs destruction, not just defeat. Gets the middle & upper Valley back to himself, easy now to catch up to Lee for the Seven Days Battles.

Today calls for Shields, as his next grift, to deal an ace off the bottom of the deck, walk it back, lick away any blood before the evidence can be removed or covered up. Every time they speak with him his story is different, he fails the polygraph, but they keep bringing him in, & each time the story changes, goes to a higher plane of criminality yet detectives stop questioning him. American inflection in his voice already, Tyrone Ireland in the rearview. Some say, out of the entire Valley Campaign, June 8 & 9 were the most “costly,” “dramatic,” & “decisive” battles, especially for Jackson.

“Only think of Gen Carroll attacking about 20000 of the enemy with about 1000 men in all of ours”—3k Union held off– for three hours– the 7 or 8k Jackson “finally got into action.” “Stubborn resistance.” Meantime, the two Northern armies– Shields & Frémont– glare at each other across the water. The river has two sides to here & neither one they can take. They’re nothing apart from each other, they’re incisions down the middle of an empty palm. They may as well be in two separate hemispheres. Today & tomorrow call for losing. Yankees retreat, tails between legs, & the defeat, Northern defeat, rides the air like a Rebel flag streamer floating in a hot breeze. It extends in all directions without ending. Absolutely black sauce—.

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