Day 34. April 3, 1862.
34
he could have gone right on up to Richmond without difficulty….
April Thursday 3 1862
Quite a fine morning. The sun came up clear and has the appearance for a fine day. Capt LL [to be true to the original, I put them as “Ls” but the first letter is probably “S” then the second an “L”. Ephraim’s two letters in the diary today look exactly alike. Huyett’s name was Samuel L. Huyett, after all] Huyett field officer today Lieut L Holiday officer of the camp and there is nothing new of importance and we have not heard from Strausburg or on the other side today. There was some fireing out there yesterday. We are doing camp duty and garding in town of Winchester. I have saw some pigeons this morning. Our camp has come down to regulations* this morning and I hope that it may continue so. The ground is dry this morning and I hope it may continue so and have a good time. We got not very much mail this evening. I hope this next mail will bring me a letter and good news from home
Note: Mail wagon: https://fineartamerica.com/featured/american-civil-war-union-mail-wagon-science-source.html
Note: Back to 1862:
Terrible Swift Sword Bruce Catton P. 293-294
“If the Federals had moved with speed, beginning in April, there would have been nothing for the Confederacy to do except call all of these detachments to Richmond, fold them into Johnston’s army, and prepare for a backs-to-the-wall fight at the gates of the capital. If McClellan had broken through the Yorktown lines in the first week of April and moved swiftly up the peninsula he would have forced his opponents to make such a concentration. The supposed threat to Washington would have disappeared, the bulk of the Federal forces would have joined McClellan, and the final showdown—the battle which, if won by the North, would have brought the war nearly to an end—would have taken place under conditions giving all the advantages to the Union.
It did not happen so. McClellan spent a month at Yorktown, and the month thus lost was a free gift to the Confederacy. Early in April, Mr. Lincoln warned McClellan that the Confederates “will probably use time as advantageously as you can,” and Lee set out to prove that Mr. Lincoln was correct. On April 25 he wrote to Stonewall Jackson, suggesting that “in the present divided condition of the enemy’s forces” a blow could be struck.”
Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War U.S. Congress 1863 P. 567
Note: Testimony of Hon. William Sprague, United States Senate. Governor of Rhode Island. March 10, 1863:
“….and that delay to us was more detrimental than the loss of hundreds, if not thousands, of men. The delay there, by demoralizing the men, destroying their health and spirits, was more to be dreaded by our army than a battle. They had been toasted and cared for about Washington for months, in warm tents, having all the luxuries of life, being overburdened with clothing, and had really become somewhat enfeebled and effeminate and that exposure there, sitting down for weeks in damp places, at once affected their efficiency; so that a loss of ten thousand men in taking Yorktown by assault would have been as nothing in comparison to the loss sustained by the operations of the siege.
P. 586
Testimony of Lemuel G. Bowden, Mayor of Williamsburg, VA.; after the creation of West VA. in 1863 he represented the restored government of VA. in the Senate. March 14, 1863:
Question: Had General McClellan moved promptly and thrown a large force upon the force the enemy had and destroyed them, would there then have been any other force that could have seriously impeded his march to Richmond?
Answer: My impression is that had he thrown forward a large force and whipped the force of the enemy there before it could be re-enforced, it would have produced a panic among the rest and he could have gone right on up to Richmond without difficulty.”
Note: Haven’t compared this to the Official Records yet, but found this testimony at A Journal of the Digitization of a Civil War Battle: https://bullrunnings.wordpress.com/2009/07/13/jccw-gen-erasmus-d-keyes
(My) Note: Erasmus Keyes is commander of Ephraim’s shindig, 1st Brigade, 1st Division (Tyler’s, which Ephraim’s in). Eventually, he’ll get ranked 3rd Brigadier-General in the entire army. Lincoln makes him commander of the IV Corps of the newly formed Army of the Potomac on 3/14/62. Keyes gets removed from command during Gettysburg for what appears to be untrue charges. Like many unfairly accused, including Ephraim’s boss Dr. Hays, charges against Keyes will never get investigated. By 5/6/64, Keyes has had enough, so quits the entire military. For now, this is what he has to say:
“….it would have been the greatest military mistake in the world to have retreated further than Centreville…. If they had followed us they might have come pell-mell into the capital.”
This is the same Daniel Gooch who will question Ephraim’s boss Dr. Hays in June of this year. But if you google him and “civil war” it’ll show a “Daniel Gucci,” Dapper Dan’s of Harlem. Nice.
Regarding Bull Run, July 21, 1861
Testimony of Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes
Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 149-152
WASHINGTON, January 8, 1862.
General E. D. KEYES sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
“Question. If Johnston had not come down to the aid of Beauregard’s army, what, in your opinion, would have been the result of that battle?
Answer. My impression is that we should have won it. I know that the moment the shout went up from the other side, there appeared to be an instantaneous change in the whole sound of the battle, so much so that I sent my aid at the top of his speed to find out what was the matter. That, as far as I can learn, was the shout that went up from the enemy’s line when they found out for certain that it was Johnston and not Patterson that had come.
By the chairman:
Question. To what did you attribute the disaster of that day?
Answer. To the want of 10,000 more troops—that is, I think if we had had 10,000 more troops than we had to go into action, say at eleven o’clock in the morning, we should certainly have beaten them. I followed along down the stream, and Sherman’s battery diverged from me, so that it left a wide gap between us, and 10,000 more men could have come in between me and Sherman, which was the weak point in our line, and before Johnston’s reserves came up it would have been won. I thought the day was won about two o’clock; but about half past three o’clock a sudden change in the firing took place, which, to my ear, was very ominous. I sent up my aide-de-camp to find out about the matter, but he did not come back.
Question. Even after the disaster, what prevented your making a stand at Centreville, and sending for re-enforcements and renewing the fight there?
Answer. I was not the commander-in-chief.
Question. I know that; I only ask your opinion of what might have been done there.
Answer. If we .had had troops that were thoroughly disciplined it would have been the greatest military mistake in the world to have retreated further than Centreville. But as our troops were raw, and this capital appeared to be the point in issue, I think men of decided military ability might have been in doubt as to the policy of remaining there. There was a striking want of generalship on the other side for not following us. If they had followed us they might have come pell-mell into the capital.
Question. If you had had knowledge on the ground, before the battle, of the condition of things with Patterson and Johnston, it seems to me that battle should not have been fought that day at all.
Answer. I should not have done it myself, certainly, if I had had that knowledge.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. I suppose there was no such absolute knowledge as that?
Answer. No, sir; I do not think there was.
A Stillness at Appomattox Bruce Catton P. 271
“Over and over the war had been prolonged because of the timid, restrictive caution that could paralyze action—the habit of mind that was always too busy weighing risks to grasp opportunities. It developed now that that habit of mind had never been eradicated because when all was said and done it had its final roots in the War Department itself. The War Department could not act and the President could not make it act. The most he could do was support a general who was bold enough to ram action down the department’s throat.
P. 323
For McClellan had always been the great symbol. He was the trumpets these soldiers had heard and the flags they had carried and the faraway, echoing cheers they had raised: the leader of an unreal army which had come marching out of the horn gates with golden light on its banners, an impossible sunrise staining the sky above its path, and now it had gone into the land of remembered dreams. Everything these men had, one supposes, they would have given to be again the army McClellan had commanded and to have him again for a leader, and yet they did not try to vote the past back into existence because they were fond young men no longer. They had come of age and they gave history something new to look at, not seen before in all the record of wars and men of war—the sight, that is, of veteran soldiers who had long outlived enthusiasm and heroics walking quietly up to ballot boxes and voting for more war to be fought by themselves instead of voting for an end to it and no more fighting.
No one did any fancy talking about it, and it is probable that very little fancy thinking was done. It is even possible to doubt that many of the veterans were consciously voting for freedom and Union. At bottom, what counted most may have been nothing more than a simple refusal to admit that they could be beaten. An officer wrote that “they were unwilling that their long fight should be set down as a failure, even though thus far it seemed so,” and that probably says it. The men were not quitters, and when it came time to vote they said so according to their understanding of the case. But it is not hard to agree with the New England soldier who, looking back after the war, remarked that the Army of the Potomac was never pluckier than when it voted by a big majority for Lincoln’s reelection and the continuation of the war.”
Note: Unbelievably, McClellan ran against Lincoln. Popular vote for Lincoln: 2,218,388. McClellan: 1,812,807. 212-21 in the Electoral College. Another of his generals– Frémont– ran but withdrew in September. The 11 States of the Confederacy weren’t counted in the 1864 election.
Also: Published in New York World on 9/23/1864, “The Miscegenation Ball,” which was a ‘cartoon’ drawing. The ball is portrayed as having actually taken place (never did) at the Headquarters of the Lincoln Central Campaign Club in NYC, & the ‘cartoon’ appeared right when McClellan gunned for Lincoln’s job. Curiously missing from the people drawn was the lack of any White women with the Black men dancing. The people portrayed in the ‘cartoon’ were Black women dancing with White men. So where was the White woman purity idea coming from? This cartoon doesn’t show that because there are no White women mixing with Black men. It wasn’t until 1967, after Loving v Virginia, that Whites & Blacks could legally marry. www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661682
Note: No, this is not the cartoon:
Shenandoah 1862: Jackson’s Valley Campaign Peter Cozzens P. 233
“Reduced rations threatened morale and invited depredations. A recovered General Shields complained to Banks on April 4 that a “want of discipline” in Gordon’s brigade had compelled his patrols to arrest several squads of men from the 3rd Wisconsin and 2nd Massachusetts found “scattered around and loitering” in the neighborhood of Edinburg. Nonsense, Gordon replied testily, his men were not loitering; the lack of rations had forced him to authorize foraging. Shield’s men, he added, were guilty of the same infractions. Banks spent a good deal of his time replying to letters from angry civilians. Two months in the Old Dominion had strained his conciliatory nature, as shown in the sharp tone he assumed in a letter to a female complainant from Woodstock:
“Permit me to suggest in answer to your note that you are mistaken in supposing we come into Virginia for your protection. We come here solely to assist in upholding the government of the United States. In exercising this duty, we desire to avoid any interference whatever with the privileges or property of the people, except when exigencies of the service require it, and whenever property is taken for public use, receipts are given and compensation secured. In every case where property has been taken for public use, orders have been given to take the surplus only and to avoid distressing any person by a total deprivation of their forage or stock.’”
Note: For more on the 2nd Mass., see May 25.
Note: Below is just about the best description of McClellan I’ve found:
Touched by Fire: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Edited by Harold Holzer P. 49
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
Jacob D. Cox, Major-General, U.S.V.
Ex-Governor of Ohio, Ex-Secretary of the Interior.
“My commission as brigadier-general in the Ohio quota in national service was dated the 23rd of April. Just about the same time Captain George B. McClellan was requested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for consultation, and, by the governor’s request, I met him at the railway station and took him to the State House. I think Mr. Lars Anderson (brother of Major Robert Anderson) and Mr. L’Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with him. The intimation had been given me that he would probably be made major-general of the Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan him closely. He was rather under the medium height, but muscularly formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head, active and graceful in motion. His whole appearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out he showed no lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain traveling dress and wore a narrow-rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed what he was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At the time, his name was a good deal associated with Beauregard’s, and they were spoken of as young men of similar standing in the engineer corps of the army, and great things were expected of them both because of their scientific knowledge of their profession, though McClellan’s report on the Crimean war was one of the few important memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army.
I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. The destitution of the State of everything like military material and equipment was very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small army out of nothing was not blinked. The governor spoke of the embarrassment he felt at every step from the lack of practical military experience in his staff, and of his desire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the details of military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood the difficulties there would be before him, and said no man could wholly master them at once, although he had confidence that if a few weeks’ time for preparation were given, he would be able to put the Ohio division into reasonable form for taking the field. The command was then formally tendered and accepted. All of us who were present felt that the selection was one full of promise and hope, and that the governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time.”
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era James McPherson P. 363-364
“McClellan was a Democrat. Some of his closest army comrades in prewar days had been southerners, including Joseph Johnston whose army at Manassas McClellan seemed reluctant to attack. Although no admirer of slavery, McClellan liked abolitionists even less. He had political ties with New York Democrats who had begun to mention him as the party’s next presidential candidate. To one of these Democrats, McClellan wrote in November: “Help me to dodge the nigger– we want nothing to do with him. I am fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union…. To gain that end we cannot afford to mix up the negro question.’”
Take Off Thy Sword, McClellan (no author cited) The Pittston Gazette (PA.) 10/27/64
(stanzas 7, 8, 9):
“Alas, alas, McClellan,
A craven crew you lead,
“Peace” glistens on their banners,
While yet our soldiers bleed.
They basely cry “surrender,”
Ere the Union is restored,
They kiss the feet of traitors,
And throw away the sword.
Have you no shame, McClellan ?
Have you forgot the past ?
Have you so long led freemen,
To herd with slaves at last ?
Alas, alas, McClellan,
It seemesth so to be,
When you raise the flag of traitors
And drop that of the free.
Take off thy sword, McClellan,
Take off thy coat of blue,
Strip quickly from thy shoulders
Those slavery badges two.
You are no more a soldier,
You’ve changed your base again,
On Peace’s platform standing,
The garb of war is vain.”
Note: From an October 1862 Chicago Tribune editorial: “What malign influence palsies our army and wastes these glorious days for fighting? If it is McClellan, does not the President see that he is a traitor?”
But let’s read what McClellan himself had to say about all this:
Hearts Touched by Fire: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Edited by Harold Holzer P. 346-347
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
George B. McClellan, Major-General, U.S.A. (excerpt)
“On the 3rd of April, at the very moment of all others when it was most necessary to push recruiting most vigorously, to make good the inevitable losses in battle and by disease, an order was issued from the War Department discontinuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking up all their recruiting stations. Instead of a regular and permanent system of recruiting, whether by voluntary enlistment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts was thereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the system of forming new regiments. The results were wasteful and pernicious. There were enough, or nearly enough, organizations in the field, and these should have been constantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and constant influx of recruits, who, by association with their veteran comrades, would soon have become efficient. The new regiments required much time to become useful, and endured very heavy and unnecessary losses from disease and in battle owing to the inexperience of the officers and men. A course more in accordance with the best-established military principles and the uniform experience of war would have saved the country millions of treasure and thousands of valuable lives.”
Note: He put the treasure first.
Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years Carl Sandburg 1954 P. 326-327
Note: November, 1862, after Lincoln removes McClellan (for more, see March 11)
“A farewell letter from McClellan read to the army was cheered. Where McClellan showed himself among the soldiers he was cheered. He had a way with him, a magnetism, and a figure and a manner. The man taking his place, Burnside, came near weeping as he told McClellan he had refused to accept command until ordered.
According to Governor Andrew, Lincoln was asked what he would reply to McClellan’s earlier advice on how to carry on the affairs of the nation. And Lincoln answered: “Nothing– but it made me think of the man whose horse kicked up and stuck his foot through the stirrup. He said to the horse, ‘If you are going to get on I will get off.’”
McClellan’s enemies seized on such incidents as one told by Colonel Albert V. Colburn of McClellan’s staff– that when the General saw the Emancipation Proclamation in the Baltimore Sun, he hurled the paper into the corner, exclaiming: “There! Look at that outrage! I shall resign tomorrow!” McClellan wrote to his wife the last of October, “…the good of the country requires me to submit to …men whom I know to be vastly my inferiors, socially, intellectually and morally. There never was a truer epithet applied to a certain individual than that of ‘Gorilla.’”
No case was ever made out that McClellan was not brave and able. Only politicians, personal enemies, loose talkers, called him coward or sloven. At Malvern Hill and Antietam he performed superbly– and then failed to clinch and use what he had won. If he had been the bold ambitious plotter that Stanton, Chase and others saw, he would have marched his army to Washington and seized the Government there, as he said many urged him to. His defect was that while he could not have instigated such treason himself, he did allow approaches to such treason to be talked freely in his staff and army without rebuke or repression from him.”
Malvern Hill Herman Melville (poetryfoundation.org)
(July, 1862)
Ye elms that wave on Malvern Hill
In prime of morn and May,
Recall ye how McClellan’s men
Here stood at bay?
While deep within yon forest dim
Our rigid comrades lay—
Some with the cartridge in their mouth,
Others with fixed arms lifted South—
Invoking so
The cypress glades? Ah wilds of woe!
The spires of Richmond, late beheld
Through rifts in musket-haze,
Were closed from view in clouds of dust
On leaf-walled ways,
Where streamed our wagons in caravan;
And the Seven Nights and Days
Of march and fast, retreat and fight,
Pinched our grimed faces to ghastly plight—
Does the elm wood
Recall the haggard beards of blood?
The battle-smoked flag, with stars eclipsed
We followed (it never fell!)—
In silence husbanded our strength—
Received their yell;
Till on this slope we patient turned
With cannon ordered well;
Reverse we proved was not defeat;
But ah, the sod what thousands meet!—
Does Malvern Wood
Bethink itself, and muse and brood?
We elms of Malvern Hill
Remember every thing;
But sap the twig will fill;
Wag the world how it will
Leaves must be green in Spring.
.
Terrible Swift Sword Bruce Catton P. 269
“But it is just here that one begins to encounter that fantastic uncertainty about numbers which was to hang over the Army of the Potomac like a fog too heavy for the winds to lift. McClellan’s headquarters was handicapped by a singular inability to determine the size either of this army or of the army which it was about to fight: a shortcoming which made victory impossible and which bewildered no one as long or as profoundly as it bewildered the commanding general himself—with whom, indeed, much of it originated.
On April 7, three days after he had begun to move up the peninsula, McClellan was unable to come within 17,000 of stating the number of men he actually had with him.
P. 271-272
Even when he came closest to accuracy, Pinkerton made a paper army look real. In addition, his reports got worse instead of better as time went on, and his estimates of the numbers McClellan would have to face finally lost all touch with reality. In the end Pinkerton was persuaded that the Confederacy had between 100,000 and 120,000 soldiers on the peninsula, and that their available forces around Richmond came to more than 180,000.
These wild guess would have done less harm, however, if there had not been at army headquarters (where such matters can be cross-checked) a will to believe them. This will McClellan had and never lost. Long after the war, when the truth about Confederate Army strengths in Virginia was clear to everyone, he clung to the belief that he had been beset everywhere by superior numbers: a belief which had no base in fact or in logic but which, if held hard enough, might perhaps justify the paralyzing indecision which governed the direction of the Army of the Potomac.
Yet this indication was more than the simple result of a belief that the enemy was the stronger. It preceded that belief, displaying itself in a baffling lack of capacity to drive a chosen path through to its conclusion, and it became visible before the spring campaign was a week old.”
“To George B. McClellan.
Washington,
My dear Sir. April 9. 1862
[Lincoln’s wire to McClellan today starts out]
“Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.”
[Lincoln’s wire to McClellan today ends up]
“I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.**
Yours very truly
A. LINCOLN”
Note: “The Little Napoleon receives another pointed reminder,” a political cartoon, ran in 1862. Notes at Umich read, “Under a signpost labeled “To Richmond,” George McClellan kneels and uses a spyglass to peer over an embankment. Abraham Lincoln, standing behind, uses a long fork to poke McClellan’s back. According to accompanying material, the cartoon was drawn by an anonymous Southerner during the Civil War.” See Lincoln grinning, sticking a fork in McClellan’s butt at Umich: https://bit.ly/3s2Uj7y
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era James McPherson P. 426
“McClellan did not act; instead he wrote to his wife* that if Lincoln wanted to break the rebel lines, “he had better come & do it himself.” While the general complained of his difficult position with “the rebels on one side, & the abolitionists & other scoundrels on the other,” he brought up his sappers and siege guns. Week after week went by as Union artillery prepared to blast the rebels from their trenches with mortars and 200-pound shells. Lincoln felt driven to distraction by this “indefinite procrastination.” As he had warned, the Confederates used the delay to shift Johnston’s whole army to the Peninsula.”
*I have the letter somewhere in this manuscript, perhaps. There’s definitely one here where he calls Lincoln a baboon, then chastises his wife for not thinking he, himself, was a great man. I don’t know how much of a break the guy deserves cut, especially after running against Lincoln, for Christ’s sake, during the war, but he is young. He’s 36 here in 1862.
Note: See June 28 for more traitorousness. Was McClellan trying to throw it? That’s the story, anyway. In some quarters. To this day. Just look at the tells. He ran against Lincoln.
**But you must act (italics in Lincoln’s original) is one of the most well-known lines of the war. It seems Lincoln tries every approach with McClellan to get him fighting but is now resorting to flicking him in the back of the head. October 13, 1862, he writes McClellan: “It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it.” He suggests that if the Rebels attack, to turn & attack them back. Edwin Stanton famously said, “If [McClellan] had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three.”
Note: 1865:
America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a Nation David Goldfield P. 361
“Sheridan’s cavalry galloped into the charred Rebel capital on Monday, April 3. Major Atherton H. Stevens Jr. of Massachusetts raised the American flag atop the Capitol.”
Note: After Richmond fell, the Confederate trains that were supposed to contain food for the soldiers arrived with guns instead; this, after Rebels had marched five days without food. That walking & walking. That booming, the empty stomach & knowing they can’t hold Richmond, that they can’t hold Charleston. Memphis. Corinth. Fort Pillow. New Orleans. Mobile. Athens. Petersburg. Macon. Atlanta. Shreveport. Vicksburg. Savannah.
.
.
nothing new of importance….
This had not exactly worked out. McClellan was in for a penny. He just wants to win the scratch off for fucking once. He swears yes on everything, but the starting line keeps getting pushed back farther: In 8 glacial months he hasn’t fought a major battle yet blames Stanton & D.C. for his parked there fixing his face like he’s at a tag sale waiting for it all to shake out– “reorganize” what we still don’t know. Was it treason how he left D.C. open? You would think so, how it played out. It was either treason or petty rivalry to show up another official, pick the official, any official with more stripes on the shoulder. But sticking feathers up your ass does not make you a chicken. Meantime, Johnston sees through McClellan, marco-polos down across the Valley, down ever closer to Richmond while Lee trots off like a wolf carrying something limp in its mouth. Crosses the Rappahannock. They’re both smelling blood, but it’s stronger for Lee. The cloacal Chickahominy was the one McClellan took after forever to move on, four long weeks of his motions for continuance on a move to Richmond, leaving Porter & his 5th Corps vulnerable. He is a national laughing stock in the press right now; he couldn’t find the Confederate Army with a search party. He wanders on & off set in a gesture toward a gesture, continua. Snakeskin boots & a zoot suit. A walk-on part in the war. He has to think this thing through. When that wears off, he’s skulking in a corner store parking lot…. he’s wearing one of those Burger King paper crowns… he’s cagey, crouching down in a dusty Pontiac Sunfire, a Monte Carlo maybe, hood ornament a bobbling Jackson on a horse.
Comes back a day later, scrunched down in a Ford Crown Victoria like an undercover cop. He’s got a strip of white torn t-shirt tied around the antennae. He’s soused, drowsed, swigging Jack mixed with shots of Southern Comfort out a paper sack. Elvis sunglasses, mirrorized. Cranking up the Molly Hatchet until the rescue chopper arrives & hands him one of those silver outerspace blankets.
I began to fear he was playing false.
.
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